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Book Reviews

BACK TO THE FUTURE
DEFENDING
LOCHNER:
REHABILITATING
PROGRESSIVE
AGAINST
RIGHTS
INDIVIDUAL
REFORM. By David Bernstein.' Chicago, University of
Chicago Press. 2011. Pp. viii, 194. $45.00 (Cloth).
William D. Araiza2

"If you think Roe' is right, why do you think Lochner4 is
wrong?"
Constitutional law professors love playing this card with
students. We like to think it forces them to confront how their
policy preferences influence their legal analysis. And it is a nice
trick: Roe v. Wade' responds to many (though not all') students'
policy intuitions about the desirability of a broad abortion right,
while Lochner v. New York7 is often taught as the paradigmatic
anti-canonical case, a dark stain on the Supreme Court in the
tradition of Dred Scott v. Sanford' and Plessy v. Ferguson' (the
1. Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law.
2. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The reviewer wishes to acknowledge
the financial support provided by the Brooklyn Law School Dean's Summer Research
Stipend Program. Thanks also to Sara Bernstein and Kristie LaSalle for fine research
assistance.
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
5. Wade, 410 U.S. at 115.
6. Some studies suggest that young people may be less committed to abortion
rights, or at least to the morality of abortion, than suggested by the standard story that
holds that younger groups are inevitably more liberal on social issues. See, e.g., ROBERT
P. JONES ET AL., COMMITTED TO AVAILABILITY, CONFLICTED ABOUT MORALITY:
WHAT THE MILLENNIAL GENERATION TELLS Us ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE
ABORTION DEBATE AND THE CULTURE WARS, 8-10 (2011) available at http://www.
publicreligion.org/research/?id=615 (polling data suggesting a "decoupling" of young
people's attitudes toward same-sex marriage and abortion).
7. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45.
8. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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latter of which is sometimes paired with Lochner as the one-two
punch of the evil Gilded Age Court).
But not so fast. David Bernstein has done admirable work
in debunking the melodramatic aspects of Lochner, and of the
Lochner era more generally. His recent book, Rehabilitating
Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against Progressive

Reform, while breaking little new analytical ground beyond his
voluminous scholarship on the issue,"o recapitulates his
impressive revisionist scholarship about Lochner and its
eponymous era. His careful research makes clear that the
Lochner era was not one in which a hopelessly reactionary Court
in the service of the economic elite continually used woodenly
formalistic reasoning to stymie needed social reform. Instead, he
paints a much more balanced picture of the contending forces of
the period.
To begin with, Bernstein views the Court's conservatives as
sincerely concerned with individual liberty, both in terms of results and philosophy. For example, consider Meyer v. Nebraska,
the 1923 case where the Court struck down a state law
prohibiting the teaching of German." Bernstein notes that Meyer
relied heavily on economic due process precedents, including
Lochner itself. Thus, to the extent that modern substantive due
process cases rely on Meyer,12 a fair case could be made that Roe
was in fact the spawn of Lochner. He also observes that Meyer
was authored by Justice McReynolds, whose notorious racism
and anti-Semitism makes him, at least among the cognoscenti,
probably the most unattractive villain of the pro-Lochner Four
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial
Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Retrospective];
David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93
GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005) [hereinafter Bernstein, Bolling]; David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era
Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism,
92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter, Bernstein, Revisionism]; David E. Bernstein,
Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1 (2003); David E. Bernstein, Book Review:
Lochner's Feminist Legacy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1960 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein,
Feminist]; David E. Bernstein, Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 211 (1999).
11. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (companion
case to Meyer).
12. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (citing Meyer but concluding that "the more pertinent beginning point" for the Court's substantive due process
analysis is Griswold); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); see also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (citing Meyer but explaining it as a First
Amendment case).
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Horsemen.13 To gild the lily, one could add to Bernstein's
analysis the observation that McReynolds' prose from the
follow-on case to Meyer, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,14 especially
his rejection of the state's authority to "standardize" children,
bears for contemporary liberals an uncomfortable resemblance
to Justice Brennan's language in Michael H. v. Gerald D. about
the protection due process affords to the freedom "not to
conform." 6
Contrast this picture of the conservative wing of the Court
with the picture Bernstein paints of their Progressive opponents,
on and off the Court. Rather than viewing them as heroic
defenders of the downtrodden, Bernstein sees them as statists
who would allow government a free hand to protect white, male,
unionized labor at the expense of less favored workers, outlaw
private (i.e., Catholic) education, and otherwise trample on
individual liberties in the service of broader social goals. Indeed,
Bernstein paints the Progressive cause in even darker terms: in
Progressives' views, less-capable workers are deemed unworthy
of protection if minimum wage laws lead to their exclusion from
the job market (pp. 53-54), women are intentionally excluded
from that market (pp. 58, 62, 65, 66), and most menacingly,
mental "defectives" are susceptible to the state's power to
sterilize them for the good of society (pp. 96-98). If Bernstein's
description of the conservatives can be summed up by
McReynolds's protection of parents' liberty to avoid state
"standardization" of their children, his description of the
Progressives can be summed up by Holmes' cruel aphorism in
Buck v. Bell: "Three generations of imbeciles is enough." 7
13. He was also notoriously cruel to his law clerks. See, e.g., Barry Cushman,
Clerking for Scrooge, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 721, 733-738 (2003); see also TODD PEPPERS,
COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME
COURT LAW CLERK 66-68 (2006).
14. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
15. Id. at 535 ("The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.").
16. 491 U.S. 110, 136, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1926). Indeed, the earlier parallel between
Justice McReynolds' language in Meyer and Justice Brennan's language in Michael H.,
see text accompanying supra notes 14-16, finds a mirror image in the comparison
between Justice Holmes and Justice Scalia: in Lochner, Holmes insisted that the Court
not strike down laws as violating substantive due process unless the statute "would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and
our law," Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 55 (1905) (Holmes J, dissenting), language
that would fit comfortably in a due process opinion written by Justice Scalia, see, e.g.,
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But the standard Lochner story may be invalid for a second
reason as well, one that Bernstein does not accept. A second
question raised by Lochner is whether Roe necessarily follows
from it, or, by contrast, whether Roe and modern due process
cases can be understood as having a different parentage. Under
an alternative view to Bernstein's, modern substantive due
process owes (or should owe) at least as much to equality concerns as to liberty." If this view is accepted, then the LochnerRoe connection is broken, or at least mitigated. In that case,
maybe there is an answer to the law professor's gotcha question.
Maybe you can agree with Roe but disagree with Lochner.
This Review follows, approximately, the structure of
Bernstein's book. Part I reviews the story of Lochner v. New
York: its facts, the opinions and the question of its jurisprudential foundation. Part II considers Lochner's implications,
both for what are now called "civil rights" or "civil liberties" and
for minorities. Part III considers the modern implications of the
absorption of many Lochner-based precedents into equal
protection or equal protection-like categories 19-in particular,
what that absorption means for Lochner's status as the father
that modern substantive due process jurisprudence refuses to
acknowledge2
I. THE LOCHNER CASE

A. THE FACTS
Bernstein's description of Lochner does much to dispel the
notion that the New York Bakeshop Law reflected a simple
story of oppressed workers seeking legislative aid against

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 586,593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. See infra Part III.
19. By "equal protection-like" I mean in particular the content-neutrality rule in
free speech and the requirement of discrimination in free exercise claims. The former in
particular is noteworthy, as the content-neutrality rule derived from a case that was
decided as an equal protection case. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972); see also Simon & Schuster v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Compensation Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124, 125 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting this
history, and tracing it to Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)).
20. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) ("We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice
Holmes' admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York"); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-482 (1965) ("Overtones of some arguments suggest that
Lochner v. State of New York should be our guide. But we decline that invitation . .
(citation omitted)).
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powerful capitalists. Bernstein argues that, as is sometimes the
case with regulatory legislation, the powerful sectors of the
relevant industry supported the law, with an eye to restricting
the competition posed by newer, smaller entrants into the
market. In this case, Bernstein argues that the large bakeries
supporting the law already satisfied its sanitary rules and
maximum working-hours provisions, and thus had little to fear
from it (p. 27). Conversely, Bernstein argues that the forces
opposed to the law were small bakeshops, in particular those
owned by recent Jewish, Italian and French immigrants (p. 24).
In setting up the conflict this way, Bernstein returns to a
theme that he has expressed before: that ostensibly pro-labor
regulatory legislation, such as laws permitting or even requiring
closed-shop arrangements, are often really attempts by
entrenched groups to secure benefits for themselves by limiting
the operation of the free market. 2 ' Bernstein has made this point
when arguing that pro-union legislation harmed AfricanAmericans who were shut out of those unions because of racism,
and thus were shut out of economic opportunities when
legislation benefitted union members at the expense of nonunion workers. In Rehabilitating Lochner he suggests similar
effects, if not similar malicious motivation, with regard to laws
regulating the terms of work performed by women (pp. 58, 62,
65, 66).22 The heroic picture of Progressive legislatures protecting
oppressed workers from rapacious capitalists becomes instead an
anti-heroic one where powerful interests groups (now including
unions) band together to preserve their monopoly privileges
against the striving of less powerful underclass groups.
But problems lurk within this story, even as Bernstein tells
it. First, a single piece of legislation may have many different
effects, some nefarious and others quite benign. For example,
Bernstein cites bakery owners who supported the law in part
21. See DAVID BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE FOR REDRESS: AFRICAN
AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO
THE NEW DEAL 111-18 (2001) (hereinafter, BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE].
22. See also Bernstein, Feminist, supra note 10, at 1971 (describing the view of
"some reformers" during the Lochner era that that "saw women workers as an obstacle
to their goal of persuading society that employers should be required to pay male heads
of households a wage sufficient to support their families" and writing that "[t]he National
Consumers' League opposed ... any ... reform that might tempt women to enter the
workforce"); id. at 1985 ("[P]rotective [labor] legislation was often promoted by labor
unions that excluded women to prevent them from competing for jobs held or sought by
union members").
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because they hoped its sanitary provisions would improve the
reputation of bakeries, thus leading consumers to patronize
them rather than baking their own bread (p. 27). Presumably,
government has a legitimate interest in increasing the public's
confidence in an industry-based food distribution network, apart
from either any discriminatory effects the law might have or any
restrictions on liberty of contract it might impose. Concededly,
this justification does not mitigate the law's impact on equality
or liberty rights. But it does blur the previously-clear picture of
the bakeshop law as purely special interest legislation, unless
legislative encouragement of industrial growth is itself special
interest legislation.
Second, the underlying facts justifying legislation are often
hard to discern conclusively. Bernstein's own research reveals
this. He notes that, in the run-up to the bakeshop law, New York
had been roiled by accounts of unsanitary conditions in bakeshops. In particular, he recounts the story of a "dying Jewish
baker. .. carried from a cellar bakery on the Lower East Side"
in 1894 (p. 25). Based on that event, the bakery union chief
convinced a newspaper to run a series of muckraking articles
investigating and exposing conditions in bakeshops. But
Bernstein expresses some doubt about the accuracy of the
reporting, based on the reporter's sympathies and the timing of
the article. He also cites two government reports that came to
contradictory conclusions about the veracity of the reporter's
conclusions (p. 25).
How is a legislature to know which facts most closely
approximate reality? More relevantly, how is a court to know?
The difficulty courts have in discerning both legislative
motivations and underlying policy facts has led, in the modern
23. If such motivations are illegitimate, then presumably broad swaths of the
common law designed to further entrepreneurship and risk-taking would be similarly
problematic. See, e.g., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 11-56 ("The decision [in Hadley v.
Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex.) 151 (1854) (limiting damages available for breach of
contract to those that are foreseeable or avoidable)] was clearly based on the policy of
protecting enterprises in the then-burgeoning industrial revolution); Joseph M. Perillo,
Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68
FORDHAM L. REv. 1085, 1096 (2000) (writing, in the context of a discussion of Hadley,
that "the rule of certainty, like the rule of foreseeability, encourages entrepreneurial risk
taking"); Jan Gordon Laitos, Continuities From the Past Affecting Resource Use and
Conservation Patterns, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 60, 83 (1975) ("The central concept of tort
liability [in the nineteenth century] reflected society's favor for production ... By
reducing legal risks through the liability concept, tort law tended to encourage
entrepreneurs to venture for productive ends.").
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era, to the extreme deference courts exhibit when considering
claims of infringements of non-fundamental rights and
discrimination against non-suspect classes. Of course, Bernstein
is an academic, not a legislator or a judge; based on his historical
investigation he might be able to draw more confident
conclusions about these issues. But even he is forced to
introduce some ambiguity into his narrative. For example, as
noted above he cites two different government studies that
reached different conclusions about the health risks of
bakeshops.
It is probably the case that both public health and antinewcomer sentiment motivated the New York legislature, just as
it is probably the case that the law both advanced public health
and disparately impacted newcomers. How great were those
effects and what was the legislature's predominant motivation
(even assuming legislative motivation is relevant)? 24 The
difficulty in answering those questions makes judicial reviewlike that in Lochner-difficult. In turn, this difficulty counsels in
favor of either narrowing the set of situations where courts will
perform careful review, or abandoning the careful review
Lochner exhibited in favor of more deferential judicial scrutiny.
But Lochner, by insisting on at least some degree of real judicial
review every time a regulation impaired one's ability to act in

24. Bernstein argues that the Court during this period did not inquire into
underlying legislative purpose (p. 15). While there is language in the caselaw supporting
this conclusion, commentators have sometimes described opinions during this period as
turning on considerations of congressional motive. See, e.g., Rosiland Dixon, Partial
ConstitutionalAmendments, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643, 663 (2011) (suggesting that the
Court considered congressional motive in the child labor cases, Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918), and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), where the
Court rejected, respectively, federal bans on interstate shipment and taxation of child
labor-manufactured goods as illegitimate attempts by Congress to regulate manufacturing). Ultimately, the distinction here may turn on whether the term "motive"
implies some level of subjective motivation or a "purpose" abstracted out from the
necessary effect of the law at issue. See, e.g., Bailey, 259 U.S. at 38 ("Although Congress
[in the ostensible tax it levied on child labor-manufactured items] does not invalidate the
contract of employment or expressly declare that the employment within the mentioned
ages is illegal, it does exhibit its intent practically to achieve the latter result by adopting
the criteria of wrongdoing and imposing its principal consequence on those who
transgress its standard."); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) ("It is
impossible to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while
passed under what is claimed to be the police power ... are, in reality, passed from other
motives. We are justified in saying so when, from the character of the law and the subject
upon which it legislates, it is apparent that the public health or welfare bears but the most
remote relation to the law. The purpose of a statute must be determined from the natural
and legal effect of the language employed .... .").
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the marketplace, opened up the specter of judicial review of
every instance of what we now call "economic and social

regulation." 25

B. A LACK OF DEFERENCE?
Lochner's insistence on more than pro forma judicial review
in every case of contractual liberty requires an examination of
the deference with which the Court acted. Justice Peckham's
opinion for the Court has been roundly criticized for its failure
to defer to the legislature's determinations. Such deference
could take one of two, or possibly three, forms. First, it could
take the form of Justice Holmes's presumption that such
legislation was constitutional, given his understanding that the
Due Process Clause simply did not protect substantive rights
such as the right to contract. In a sense, the Holmes approach is
not deference at all, as it reflects a bright-line rule that the
Constitution simply does not speak to the claim at issue.
A second approach, one that is deferential in the true sense
of the word, is reflected by the modern rational basis standard
used to decide cases where non-fundamental rights are alleged
to be unconstitutionally infringed. This approach, while similarly
yielding predictable government wins, at least leaves open the
theoretical possibility that a law could be so arbitrary that it
violates the substantive guarantee of liberty found in the Due
Process Clause. Finally, a third approach, the one associated
with Justice Harlan's Lochner dissent, defers to government
determinations that the public interest requires an infringement
on liberty, but does so only after something more than
perfunctory judicial review.
Did Justice Peckham really refuse to defer? His opinion for
the Court reads at times like a breezy rejection of the
legislature's findings: he relied on "the common understanding"
that "the trade of a baker has never been understood as an
unhealthy one,"2 and then complained that upholding the New
York law would render susceptible to state regulation every
profession, since, "unfortunately ... labor, even in any department [sic], may possibly carry with it the seeds of
unhealthiness."27 On the other hand, he also wrote that he
25.
26.
27.

See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766 (1977) (using this term).
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.
Id.
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reached his conclusion about the health risk of being a baker "in
looking through statistics regarding all trades and occupations.""
Indeed, Bernstein elsewhere argues that Peckham "clearly relied
on-but, to the detriment of his reputation, did not explicitly
cite-the studies discussed in the appendix to Lochner's brief
showing bakers had similar mortality rates to many ordinary
professions that the legislature did not regulate." 29 But even had
Peckham explicitly cited those studies he still would have been
susceptible to the criticism that he was choosing for himself
which studies to rely on and which to discredit. By contrast,
Harlan explicitly cited studies that supported the view that
baking was unhealthful work.30 Based on that evidence, he
concluded that the law was not "beyond all question a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by" the Constitution.3 The
charge of failure to defer appears solid.
More generally, Bernstein's careful analysis of the differing
deference levels in the various Lochner opinions helpfully
illuminates two distinct disagreements on the Court. One,
between Holmes and the eight Justices comprising the Peckham
majority and the Harlan dissent, centered on the existence of an
unenumerated right to contract, and, indeed, on whether the
Due Process Clause protected any substantive rights whatsoever.
The other faultline exposed by Lochner concerned the amount
of deference legislatures were due when they regulated in ways
that impaired contractual liberty. Both of these divisions were
moving targets: by 1925, Justice Holmes was willing to recognize,
based on the Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause in
other contexts, that the Clause provided at least some protection
for the freedom of speech.32 Similarly, Bernstein notes that in the
second decade of the twentieth century the Court became
significantly friendlier to government regulation, but then

28. Id.
29. See Bernstein, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1498.
30. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 71 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Bernstein elsewhere notes
that the studies Harlan cited did not appear in New York's brief. Bernstein,
Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1499.
31. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
32. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The
general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the
Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word 'liberty' as
there used .... "); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (recognizing, based on precedent, that the Due Process Clause provided
substantive guarantees that included the First Amendment right to freedom of speech).
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increased its scrutiny again with the ascension of several Harding
appointees (pp. 48-49).
Here again Bernstein performs a useful service by performing a more fine-grained analysis of the Lochner Court. In
particular, by considering Harlan's dissent he does much to
dispel the black-and-white narrative that too often passes as the
truth about Lochner. However, his carefulness in delineating the
different phases of the Lochner era has the ironic effect of
watering down the force of his argument about the Court's mode
of analysis during this period, and the implications of its
approach. Simply put, it is harder to paint a coherent picture of
how much the Court deferred to legislative judgments (and thus
how strictly it protected the right to contract), and how its
approach impacted minorities and other outsiders, given the
Court's evolution from its early-phase stringent review to its
middle-phase (relatively) lenient review, and then back again.33
Obviously, it's not Bernstein's fault that the Court didn't
apply a consistent analytical approach during this period, even if
that ambiguity does muddy his underlying narrative. More
importantly for our purposes, the question of how much the
Lochner-era Court really deferred to marketplace regulation
becomes less important once the economic regulation cases
provided the foundation for the Court's non-economic liberty
jurisprudence. To the extent the marketplace cases generated
Meyer and its progeny, the impact of that generative process
persisted, even if the stringency of the Court's underlying
economic due process analysis waxed and waned.
C. LIBERTY OR EQUALITY?

In Rehabilitating Lochner, Bernstein makes a powerful
argument that Lochner was based on liberty rather than equality
concerns. To many ears this may sound obvious. However,
Bernstein rightly chooses to spend time addressing the argument, most fully developed by Michael Les Benedict and
Howard Gillman, that Lochner-erajurisprudence focused less on
protecting individual liberty than on ensuring that government
not enact so-called "class legislation."3 4 Anxiety about class
33. Indeed, Bernstein speculates that Lochner itself included statements that not all
members of the five-Justice majority agreed with (pp. 34-35). Thus, even the case itself
arguably stands for less than what it appears to at face value.
34. See generally Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faireand Liberty: A Re-Evaluation
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legislation-that is, legislation that bestowed benefits and
burdens unequally, and in particular legislation that granted
monopoly privileges-was surely a major concern of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Bernstein acknowledges that avoidance of class legislation was a major concern of the original
framers (who expressed it as a concern about faction)," antebellum constitutional thinkers and the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment (pp. 14-15)." But in his other writing, Bernstein
argues that the class legislation prohibition was never interpreted stringently by the Supreme Court." Indeed, he contrasts
the Supreme Court with some state high courts, which he argues
enforced equality guarantees strictly. 8
It is difficult in a short review to evaluate which side has the
better of the debate, in large part because, as Bernstein himself
notes, class legislation restrictions constituted part of the Court's
understanding of due process. This should not be surprising: our
current practice of rigidly separating substantive rights, protected under due process, from equality rights, protected under
equal protection, was likely alien to the Fourteenth
Amendment's drafters, or at least not their primary understanding.39 For confirmation, one need only look to the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, which protected not a particular level of
contract and property rights, but the same level of protection as
that a state granted white citizens.40
For our purposes, it is unnecessary to resolve this dispute.
Regardless of Lochner's basis, the fact remains that the Meyer
line of cases began to diverge from any explicit concern with
of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293
(1985); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
35. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 34, at 22 ("[the distinctions Lochner era judges
attempted to draw between valid public-purpose legislation ... and invalid class
legislation ... had their origins in a similar set of distinctions elaborated by the framers of
the Constitution").
36. Mark G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and Sex Discrimination:
One Small Cheer for Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 137374 (1990); see also Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation and
Colorblindedness,96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 251-68 (1997).
37. See Bernstein, Revisionism, supra note 10, at 15-21; Bernstein, Feminist, supra
note 10, at 1963.
38. See Bernstein, Revisionism, supra note 10, at 18-20.
39. A vestige of this understanding may remain today in the fundamental rights
strand of equal protection. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
40. See, e.g., Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Under Law 237 (1965) (concluding that the
Equal Protection Clause required full-that is, substantive-protection for these rights).
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class legislation or equality. Certainly these cases can be
understood as dealing with unequal or discriminatory legislation.
Indeed, that fact may allow their legitimate reconceptualization
as cases about discrimination.4 1 But language about class
legislation is largely absent from the actual opinions. Thus, one
can remain agnostic about the liberty vs. class legislation debate
in Lochner while still recognizing that, somehow, Lochner's
progeny became based on substantive liberty rather than on the
requirement that all legislation be general.
II. LOCHNER'S IMPLICATIONS
The middle chapters of RehabilitatingLochner-Chapters 4
and 5, and to a great degree Chapter 6-consider Lochner's
implications for, respectively, sex equality, racial equality, and
what we now call "civil rights" or "civil liberties." Bernstein
makes important claims in these chapters, which are all the more
significant because they challenge the standard view that
Lochner-erajurisprudence inevitably favored powerful interests
at the expense of the powerless. These claims deserve a closer
look.
A. CIVIL LIBERTIES AND LOCHNER
What did Lochner mean for the rights we today call "civil
rights" or "civil liberties?" Bernstein is persuasive in arguing
that Lochner was the doctrinal font for the Court's gradual
embrace of such rights in the 1920's and 1930's. He notes that
Justice McReynolds's opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska4 2 relied
heavily on economic due process cases as support for the
proposition that the Due Process Clause protects a parent's right
to direct his child's upbringing.43 More generally, Lochner-era
Justices favoring the right to contract also played important roles
in expanding civil liberties. For example, Justice McReynolds, in
41. See infra Part II(A).
42. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (companion
case to Meyer).
43. Later opinions upholding constitutional rights claims did not rely as heavily on
economic due process as the foundation. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-67
(1932) (relying on history and general statements in early cases about the possibility that
"due process" included specific Bill of Rights guarantees to incorporate the Sixth
Amendment); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (assuming, without deciding
or giving extended discussion, that due process liberty included the freedom of speech).
But see 268 U.S. at 666 n.9 (citing, among other cases, the statement in Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915), that liberty and property are "human rights").
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writing Meyer, used expansive language about the scope of
individual liberty," while Justice Sutherland wrote important
civil liberties opinions in the criminal procedure" and press
freedom46 areas. Conversely, Justices Holmes and Brandeis were,
at best, reluctant converts to the cause of substantive due
process liberty.47
So it seems like an open and shut case that Lochner is the
font of the Court's first protections of civil liberties, and thus of
the Court's modern individual rights jurisprudence. But the
picture is at least slightly more complicated. As Bernstein
himself has noted in his previous scholarship on the Lochner era,
many of those early civil rights cases dealt with government
action that had severe disparate impacts on minorities. The
statute struck down in Meyer was the product of anti-German
xenophobia during the World War I era," while the law at issue
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters clearly aimed at Catholic

education,49 the hangover from the bitter nineteenth century
disputes between Protestants seeking to inculcate their religious
values via public education and Catholics seeking to preserve
44. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 ("While this court has not attempted to define with
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
45. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Powell was the case dealing with
"the Scottsboro Boys," African-American young men who were victimized by a racist
criminal justice system in the South.
46. See Am. Press v. Grosjean, 297 U.S. 233 (1936); ARTHUR HELLMAN, WILLIAM
ARAIZA AND THOMAS BAKER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND

RELIGION 820 (2nd ed. 2010) (noting Sutherland's position).
47. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is
settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure."); Gitlow, 258 U.S. at 671 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be
included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the
word 'liberty' as there used"); see also p. 101 (describing Holmes' recognition that due
process protects the freedom of speech as "grudging").
48. See Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1273 ("The Meyer law had been
motivated by nativist hysteria attendant to World War I.").
49. See Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1274 (describing the law struck down in
Pierce as "inspired by anti-Catholic sentiment"). For an alternative view, see Steven J.
Macias, The Huck Finn Syndrome in History and Theory: The Origins of Family Privacy,
12 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 87, 105-09 (2010) (arguing that the Oregon referendum leading to
the law struck down in Piercewas not heavily motivated by anti-Catholic animus).
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their values via parochial education."o The major speech cases of
the era all dealt (as they usually do) with the speech of
dissenters, usually unpopular ones at that." For their part the
criminal procedure cases dealt with criminal defendants, hardly
the most popular group in any polity. This fact was especially
true during this era, as the key cases that began using the Due
Process Clause to incorporate the Bill of Rights' criminal
procedure provisions dealt with racist southern criminal justice
systems and African-American defendants.52
Indeed, as Bernstein briefly notes (p. 104), the Court in the
53
famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products
transformed Meyer, Pierce and similar cases5 into cases that
stood for the proposition that "similar considerations [requiring
more stringent judicial review than normal] enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religious or national or racial
minorities."" Bernstein is more than grudging here: referring to
footnote four's treatment of the Meyer line of cases, he writes as
follows: "The Court creatively reinterpreted-that is, intentionally misinterpreted-Meyer and Pierce as decisions
invalidating laws because the laws discriminated against
minorities" (p. 104).
50. See, e.g., Meir Katz, The Economics of Section 170: A Case for the Charitable
Deduction of Parochial School Tuition, 12 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 224, 259 n.134
(2011) (noting this phenomenon in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries);
Christopher C. Lund, The New Victims of the Old-Anti-Catholicism 4-7, 10-11 (Wayne
State University Law School Working Paper No. 10-13), available at http://ssrn.
comlabstract=1943646 (same); see also id. at n.1 (citing sources); Bernstein, Bolling,
supra note 10, at 1274 (discussing Farringtonv. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927), a case
dealing with a Hawaii law restricting foreign-language education, which Bernstein
describes as "designed to shut down Japanese-language schools in Hawaii").
51. E.g., Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 252 (considering a free speech challenge to a New York
law aimed at agitation in favor of the overthrow of private property); Herndon v.
Lowery, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (finding First Amendment protection for Communist
literature calling for a separate state for African Americans living in the South).
52. E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ("Scottsboro Boys" case). Note,
however, that pro-Lochner Justices Butler and McReynolds dissented in Powell, albeit
on a narrow ground. See Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 492 n.18 (2009) (citing cases); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling
Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 764 (1991) ("The vast
majority of the Court's first constitutional interventions in state criminal procedure
involved the Jim Crow 'justice' southern states meted out to black defendants.").
53. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
54. See id. (citing Meyer, Pierce, and also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), the
companion case to Meyer, and Farrington, which dealt with a similar restriction on
foreign-language schools in the very different context of Hawaii, where the Court, relying
on Meyer, Pierce and Bartels, struck down the law).
55. Id.
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The stridency of Bernstein's criticism seems a little unfair.
Bernstein does not develop the argument in Rehabilitating
Lochner, but in other scholarship he has argued that the Meyer
line of cases and others (most notably Adkins v. Children's
Hospital6 and Buchanan v. Warley") are based on an approach
in which, once a court identifies a protected liberty interest that
the law infringes, discriminatory motives or goals are insufficient
to provide a police power justification for the infringement."
Thus, his argument with regard to footnote four's treatment of
Meyer seems to be that footnote four focused on the fact of
discrimination, rather than on the insufficiency of discriminatory
motives as justification for an infringement on liberty rights.
In theory this is a real distinction. Under Bernstein's
understanding of how the Lochner-era Court analyzed cases like
Meyer, a crucial first step was the identification of a liberty right.
If no liberty right was at stake, that was the end of the case-the
government won. But if such a liberty right did exist, the
government could not justify its infringement by claiming a
discriminatory motive. 9 By contrast, under footnote four's
formula, discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority
triggered closer judicial scrutiny. Not only was there not any
preliminary inquiry into the existence of a liberty interest, but
the entire focus of the analysis moved away from the
government's police power-based reasons for infringing on a
liberty interest and toward to the government's justifications for
the discrimination itself. In sum, the focus shifts from liberty
interests to anti-discrimination simpliciter.
But this distinction may be more theoretical than real, at
least if due process is to do the work Bernstein thinks it should.
Consider Bolling v. Sharpe,0 the companion case to Brown v.

56. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a District of Columbia ordinance mandating
a minimum wage for women).
57. 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (striking down a Louisville, Kentucky, ordinance prohibiting
real estate sales that would lead to residential integration).
58. See Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1270-73.
59. See, e.g., Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 80-82 (noting, and rejecting, the city's racebased reasons for the ordinance); Adkins, 261 U.S. at 552-53 (noting, and rejecting, the
government's arguments about women's incapacity to contract as justifications for the
law); see also Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10, at 1272 ("In Buchanan the Court held
that denial of property rights for African Americans could not be based on weak racerelated police power rationales. In Adkins, the Court held that women could not be
denied liberty of contract based solely on weak gender-related police power
rationales.").
60. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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Board of Education,61 in which the Court struck down school
segregation in District of Columbia schools. As Bernstein has
elsewhere argued,62 Bolling is a confused opinion. The absence
of an Equal Protection Clause binding the federal government
required the Court to rely on the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. While that Clause had long been understood as
including some restriction on discrimination, 63 Bolling's reliance
on due process inevitably raised the specter of resurrecting
Lochner-era jurisprudence, especially given how the Lochnerera Court had combined concepts of liberty and equality.
Bernstein has argued that Bolling would have been a more
coherent opinion had the Court forthrightly relied on the Meyer
line of cases to recognize a liberty to attend a non-segregated
public school, and then, following Lochner-era analysis, had
rejected racially discriminatory justifications for the law. But
this approach requires recognizing a liberty interest in attending
a non-segregated public school. That move seems to be a stretch.
As Bernstein himself notes, it is susceptible to the objection that
"once a Lochnerian Court acknowledged that access to a
government-provided service could be construed as a liberty
right, the entire classical/libertarian edifice of Lochner would be
lost."6' His response-that "a libertarian might argue that to
subsidize one group is the economic equivalent of taxing its
competitors"-and thus that "[t]o subsidize whites' education
more than blacks' education .. . is, by economists' lights, the
equivalent of taxing blacks more than whites"" seems, at least at
first glance, to erase any boundaries on what we call liberty
rights. If discriminatory access to public education violates the
victim's liberty, then presumably so does discriminatory access
to a government contract" or broadcasting license," or
discriminatory access to any government service at all.69 If

61.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

62. See generally Bernstein, Bolling, supra note 10.
63. See generally id.
64. See, e.g., id. at 1282.
65. Id. at 1283 (emphasis in original).
66. Id.
67. E.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
68. E.g., Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
69. E.g., Kotch v. Bd. of Riverboat Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (government appointment as riverboat pilot); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)
(discriminatory access to a city water hookup).
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anything becomes a liberty interest, then searching for a liberty
interest becomes a purely formalistic exercise.'o
The upshot is that if Bernstein is going to argue that the
Bolling Court could have reached the same result via the
standard Lochner-style approach to discriminatory deprivations
of liberty, then presumably most, if not all, modern equal
protection fact patterns can be understood in this way as well.
Perhaps more to the point, if one is willing to expand the notion
of liberty as Bernstein is in his discussion of Bolling, then the
Lochner Court's own precedents-Meyer, Pierce, Farrington,

Buchanan and Adkins-can be legitimately understood as cases
focusing on the discrimination, not on the liberty interest.
Hence my suggestion that Bernstein is perhaps too harsh in
his evaluation of Carolene Products'sreconceptualization of the
Lochner-era civil rights cases. In addition to the analysis
sketched out above, the rhetoric of those cases rests easily within
a basic concern for equality, separate from the status of the
regulated conduct as a liberty interest. For example, Adkins'
concern for the equal dignity of women fits easily within modern
equal protection doctrine's aspiration to eradicate stereotypes
about women's capabilities while recognizing government's
legitimate authority to compensate women for past discrimin-71
ation and account for real differences between the sexes.
Similarly, Justice McReynolds' refusal in Pierce to allow the
government to "standardize" its children72 can be reasonably
70. It is true enough that there remains a distinction between the Lochner Court's
second step-considering the police power justifications for the law-and modern equal
protection doctrine's approach of considering the government interests behind the
challenged classification. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (testing the state's
gender-based classification against its highway-safety justifications). But this may be a
distinction without a difference. The type of police power argument that government
may have made, say, in Adkins-that women are incapable of contracting as effectively
as men, and thus need the government's assistance-closely tracks the type of argument
a modern government-defendant would make when defending a classification against an
equal protection challenge. For example, a modem government-defendant defending a
law classifying based on gender might well argue that women are truly different from
men, and merit different treatment. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001)
(accepting this type of argument). Of course, there still has to be some positive
justification for the law, rather than simply a claim that the two groups are similarly
situated. This is simply a restatement of the fundamental rule that every law must have a
justification. But if Bernstein is correct that the Lochner-era Court gave legislatures
broad latitude to legislate for the public good, then the deference with which the modem
Court applies this rule would not differ greatly from how the Lochner Court would apply
the analogous rule that a law must be within the government's police power.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996).
72. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).

128

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 28:111

read as reflecting a concern about dissenting or minority
approaches to basic issues such as child-rearing and family
structure."
Such a reconceptualization would not make the Pierce line
of cases incoherent or anomalous. For example, approximately
sixty years after Meyer, Justice Brennan in Michael H. v. Gerald

D.-another due process case-spoke of the freedom "not to
conform.",4 Tellingly, such freedoms have also been vindicated
via the Equal Protection Clause." And approximately sixty years
before Meyer, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed to all
individuals the "same rights" to contractual and other liberties, 6
an equality right whose constitutionalization all agree was at
least one of the major goals of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Indeed, even during the Lochner era the Court was already
experimenting with this reconceptualization. For example, in
Nixon v. Herndon," seemingly an equal protection case,79 the
Court cited Buchanan as an example of invidious race
discrimination, without any mention of the liberty interest
Buchanan originally focused on."o
73. This concern can work its way through the doctrine either via due process, as
with Pierce and Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (considering a challenge to
a California law conclusively presuming paternity to the husband of a woman bearing a
child), or equal protection, as with Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973) (striking down, as violating equal protection, a law that denied food stamp
benefits to members of unrelated communal homes). See also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)
(agreeing that a city's denial of a zoning exemption to a group seeking to establish a
group home for mentally retarded persons violated equal protection, but arguing that the
level of scrutiny to be accorded the government action should depend in part on the fact
that the action infringed on the right to establish a residence in a given area). See also
supra note 39.
74. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also text
accompanying supra note 16 (repeating this parallel).
75. See supra note 73.
76. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31 § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
77. E.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 26-27 (2d ed. 1997);
WILLIAM NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 104 (1988); TENBROEK, supra note 40 at 224-25.

78. 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (striking down a Texas law authorizing state political parties
to exclude whoever they wished from primary voting, as violating the Fourteenth
Amendment when applied by the state Democratic Party to exclude AfricanAmericans).
79. See id. at 89 ("The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted as it was with special
solicitude for the equal protection of members of the Negro race, lays a duty upon the
court to level by its judgment these barriers of color.").
80. See id. at 89 ("Delegates of the State's power have discharged their official
functions in such a way as to discriminate invidiously between white citizens and black.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 77 [(1917)]. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted as

2012]

BOOK REVIEWS

129

Thus, it is not self-evident that Justice Stone's "creative[]
misinterpret[ation]" of the Meyer line of cases was illegitimate,
as suggested by Bernstein's dismissal of that move. Creative,
yes-even aggressive. Bernstein is right that the Lochner-era
civil rights opinions were doctrinally focused on due process. But
the fact that due process doctrine rejected discrimination as a
legitimate police power objective means that equality considerations would enter into the Court's analysis, at least in cases that
were ripe for recasting in footnote four as equal protection cases.
This recasting is not necessarily illegitimate, if by 1938 the Court
had come to realize that the Meyer line of cases, the Court's
then-nascent protection for speech, association and voting rights,
and indeed, the protection of all Bill of Rights provisions it
decided to incorporate, were correct exactly because they presented appropriately-cabined situations where more intrusive
judicial review was called for, while avoiding such review every
time government regulated the marketplace.
Bernstein is also correct when he states, immediately after
the "intentionally misinterpreted" sentence above,82 that footnote four "was the Court's first of several attempts to preserve
[the Meyer] line of cases by disentangling them from their roots
in the now-obsolete liberty of contract line of cases" (p. 104).
But by itself that does not prove that the Court's action was
illegitimate. It is not unknown for the Court to "disentangle"
holdings it deems correct from an underlying context or
foundation it finds problematic.83 Concededly, such attempts are
potentially problematic, exactly because they provoke the
response that the Court is simply picking the results it wants to
preserve and pruning away the context of surrounding
undesirable results in an unprincipled way." But given the
it was with special solicitude for the equal protection of members of the Negro race, lays
a duty upon the court to level by its judgment these barriers of color." (parallel and
additional citations omitted)).
81. As implied by Carolene Products, such careful review is justified in these
situations because of either the likelihood of a political process breakdown or, in the case
of specific Bill of Rights provisions, the greater legitimacy of judicial enforcement of
specifically-worded constraints on government action. See United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
82. See supra text accompanying note 53.
83. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (arguing that it is
preserving the "central holding" of Roe while correcting other doctrinal mistakes Roe
made).
84. See, e.g., id at 979, 993 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (making a similar objection to the joint opinion's treatment of Roe).
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foundation of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers' concern
with both liberty and equality, not to mention later justices'
attempts to determine the scope of due process rights by
recourse to equality concerns," Stone's reconceptualization of
these cases deserves at least more study than the quick dismissal
Bernstein provides.
Regardless of one's views about this question, the point
remains that Lochner did ultimately make footnote four
possible, by paving the way for cases like Meyer and in turn their
eventual reconceptualization as equality cases. This insight raises
a further, more practical question about Lochner and minorities:
how good was Lochner itself for the minorities that its progeny
eventually were understood to protect?
B. LOCHNER AND MINORITIES

Bernstein argues forcefully that Lochner, and the muscular
protection of substantive due process rights it represents, was
good for minorities. As explained above, he draws a clear line
connecting Lochner, the Meyer line of cases and the Court's
ultimate protection of free expression and criminal procedure
rights. His argument is hard to refute: even if, as suggested above,
the non-economic due process cases can legitimately be reconceptualized as cases about discrimination, the fact remains that
the opinions themselves relied on Lochner and its progeny. In
this way, Bernstein is right to conclude that Lochner eventually
redounded to the significant benefit of minorities.
However, Bernstein pushes the argument further. First, he
argues that economic due process itself helped minorities by
providing a means for courts to strike down discriminatory
government action that impeded the core Lochner right to
contract. In RehabilitatingLochner, Bernstein presses the point
that Lochner, by leading to the striking down of the Louisville,
Kentucky, residential segregation ordinance in Buchanan v.
Warley, provided an important tool for African-Americans to
gain a residential and thus social foothold in major cities.

85. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 140 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that due process protects the "freedom not to conform"); Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (noting that a holding about the due process right of
gays and lesbians to engage in consensual non-commercial sexual intimacy also furthers
equal protection values).
86. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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This is a provocative claim. To his credit, Bernstein does not
over-argue it. Thus, he writes:
Giving Buchanan its due does not absolve the Supreme Court
of its acquiescence to Jim Crow in other contexts. Nor does it
remotely suggest that the pre-New Deal Court's civil rights
jurisprudence was superior to that of later Supreme Courts
which, like American society more generally, became
increasingly egalitarian on race. But, given that advocates of
racial equality were a distinct minority among Progressives,
the practical alternative to the early twentieth century's
liberty of contract jurisprudence was not the Warren Court's
liberalism but the indifference or hostility to the rights of
African Americans shown by most Progressive legal elites (p.
85).
Still, Bernstein insists that "Buchanan's implicit protection of
[African-American] migration to urban areas, north and south,
proved a crucial turning point in African American history"87 (p.
83).
This claim seems to me unproven, at least in Rehabilitating
Lochner. Indeed, the structure of the sentence quoted above
suggests that Bernstein himself may not consider the claim fully
proven: the way he writes the sentence, what proved to be "a
crucial turning point in African American history" was the
implicit protection provided by Buchanan. It's not clear how an
implicit effect can confidently be stated as providing "a crucial
turning point" in history. More generally (if still technically), as a
historical matter the great migration of African-Americans to
the north was already under way by 1917. If Buchanan had
come out the other way would that phenomenon have reversed?
Probably not, although it's certainly plausible that it might have
been mitigated, or that the arriving African-American populations would have found themselves even more socially
isolated than they ended up being.
But a larger problem confronts Bernstein's claim that
Lochner, via Buchanan, hastened African-Americans' full
geographic and social integration into American life. This larger
87. See also Bernstein, Retrospective, supra note 10, at 1505-06 (Buchanan "allowed
hundreds of thousands of African Americans to leave impoverished rural plantations for
a better life in cities.").
88. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51
VAND. L. REV. 881, 897-98 (1998) ("Black migration northwards, which had appreciably
increased in the 1890's and 1900's, exploded in 1916 owing to World War I."); id. at 900.
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problem in turn casts doubt on Lochner's more general benefits
for minorities. If Buchanan prevented cities from enacting laws
like the Louisville segregation ordinance, then it must also be
recognized that residential segregation continued unabated
throughout the Lochner period. Northern cities were not
suddenly integrated because of Buchanan. If the response to this
observation is that that segregation arose from private choices
rather than government action, the reply is that such private
choices themselves would likely have been constitutionally
protected by the same Lochner doctrine. Indeed, a case of a
white seller refusing to sell to a black buyer in defiance of a nondiscrimination ordinance would feature the mirror image of the
rights claim vindicated in Buchanan. More generally, restrictive
covenants, famously struck down in Shelly v. Kraemer9 and
9 featured private party contracts that the
Barrows v. Jackson,"
Lochner Court presumably would have respected.'
Concededly, the key issue in Shelley and Barrows was the
Court's conclusion that judicial enforcement of the covenant
constituted state action-not, at least technically, a rejection of
property owners' claims that they had the right to contract to
dispose of their property as they wished.' Nevertheless, it is hard
to believe that the Lochner Court, so committed to respecting a
sphere of private freedom of action, would have adopted the
same state action analysis as that of the very different,
Roosevelt-dominated, Court in Shelley and Barrows. Indeed,
Plessy v. Ferguson's stubborn insistence that any badge of
inferiority connoted by the Louisiana train segregation statute
89. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
90. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
91. See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926) (suggesting the meritlessness
of a claim that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant by a District of
Columbia court violated the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment); see also Klarman, supra.
note 88, at 942 n.336 (noting state court decisions holding that such judicial enforcement
did not constitute state action).
92. Of course, the Court's broad understanding of state action in Shelley had the
potential effect of converting private contractual decisions into state action. In this sense,
Shelley's state action analysis effectively restricted private parties' contractual freedom
by rendering that freedom subject to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, at
least to the extent a contracting party sought a court's aid in vindicating the terms of the
contract.
Commentators have noted the potentially broad effect of Shelley's analysis on
private parties' freedom to contract as they wish. See, e.g., ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER
MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 20-21 (5th ed. 2010); Martin Dolan,
Comment, State Inaction and Section 1985(3): United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America v. Scott, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1280-81 (1986).
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flowed from African-Americans' own perceptions, and not the
state itself,9 3 suggests that the Lochner-era Court was not
committed to a broad conception of state action. 94 Thus,
instances of private discrimination with regard to real estate
transactions not only continued to exist after Buchanan, but
presumably enjoyed constitutional protection based on the same
freedom of contract doctrine that underlay Buchanan itself.
If this analysis is correct, it follows that legislative action
attacking such private discriminatory choices-not just in real
estate, but more generally throughout the economy-would also
be suspect under Lochner-style reasoning. In particular,
employment non-discrimination and other similar laws likely
would have been attacked during this era as inconsistent with
Lochner's presumptive protection for the rights of individuals to
decide with whom they wished to deal.95 If a law prohibiting
employers from demanding that would-be employees not join a
union unconstitutionally violated both groups' freedom of
contract,96 then presumably a law requiring employers, shop93. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) ("We consider the underlying
fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it.").
94. It is true that the Court was willing to find state action in legislation that authorized political party action. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (striking down, as
state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment, a Texas law authorizing state political
committees to set their own membership qualifications, as implemented by the state
Democratic Party in a racially discriminatory way); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927) (invalidating a predecessor statute to the one struck down in Condon, which
explicitly barred African-Americans from participating in a Democratic Party primary,
but not discussing the state action issue). The Herndon statute's explicit government
discrimination makes it understandable why the state action issue was not explicitly
discussed. It is worth noting that where that issue mattered, in Condon, the Four
Horsemen dissented. See Condon, 286 U.S. at 90 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
95. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373,
384 (2003) ("Anti-discrimination laws did not exist during the Lochner era but would
certainly be challenged as abridgments of freedom of contract today if Lochner
survived."); Klarman, supra note 88, at 939 n.323 ("The same substantive due process
notions that invalidate residential segregation ordinances can be invoked to invalidate
civil rights statutes on the ground that the state should not interfere with the contractual
freedom of employers or owners of places of public accommodation."). With regard to
places of public accommodation it is at least possible that their common law foundation
might save their constitutionality, to the extent that foundation implied a legitimate
police power justification for them. See generally Joseph Singer, No Right To Exclude:
Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996).
96. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down state law prohibiting
discharge of an employee for joining a union); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908) (striking down similar federal law).
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keepers and real property owners not to discriminate would be
similarly vulnerable, even in light of the fact that the Lochner
Court upheld much social and economic regulation. It was only
when the right to contract fell from favor that the due process
argument against such laws became, if not frivolous, then at least
a likely loser.97
Second, as a practical matter it's not clear what effect
Lochner had on minorities. In Rehabilitating Lochner Bernstein
cites only a state court case from Georgia, invalidating a law
prohibiting black barbers from cutting white children's hair, as
an example of "liberty of contract reasoning" that was used in a
way to further the interests of African-Americans" (p. 85). To
his credit, Bernstein recognizes that civil rights lawyers of the era
did not have the resources to litigate such claims aggressively.
He also suggests that groups such as the NAACP were not
inclined to rely on liberty of contract reasoning, since "by the
1920's the NAACP's leadership had an economically
'Progressive' outlook, and was therefore hesitant to rely on
'conservative' constitutional doctrines like liberty of contract"
(p. 85).
These observations betray more ambiguities with
Bernstein's thesis that, for minorities, the liberty of contract was,
if not perfect, at least the best thing they had going.' Most
notably, if the lack of resources meant that civil rights groups
were not able to enforce African-Americans' contractual liberty
rights then one can at least argue that a better strategy would
have been for them to enlist the aid of government, via antidiscrimination statutes. Of course, Bernstein is correct in his
implicit suggestion that aggressive non-discrimination legislation
was not forthcoming in the 1920's.1 In that sense, there's merit
97. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964)
(rejecting a due process challenge to the public accommodations provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 by applying a very deferential rational basis standard); id. at 275, 277
(Black, J., concurring) ("In the past this Court has consistently held that regulation of the
use of property by the Federal Government or the States does not violate either the Fifth
or the Fourteenth Amendment.").
98. Bernstein does cite one other case, dealing with ethnic Chinese merchants in
the Philippines, where liberty of contract reasoning was used to assist an ethnic minority.
(p. 85 n.93, citing Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 50 (1926) (invalidating a Philippines
law requiring that business records be kept either in English or Spanish)).
99. Bernstein has developed this thesis in more detail elsewhere. See BERNSTEIN,
ONLY ONE PLACE, supra note 21.
100. On the other hand, by the 1920's some states had enacted public accommodations laws. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 95, at 1374 (noting that states started
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in his claim that Lochner might have been the best tool
minorities had. But again, to the extent that such legislation
would have been threatened by exactly that same liberty of
contract doctrine, it may be the case that had Lochner survived
into the civil rights era it would have impeded AfricanAmericans' civil rights legislative agenda.'o
This insight perhaps suggests why the NAACP leadership
"was . . . hesitant to rely on 'conservative' constitutional doctrines like liberty of contract"o2 (p. 85). Alternatively, perhaps
that hesitancy was based more on the needs of a tactical alliance
with anti-Lochner northern Progressives. But if this latter
speculate is accurate, it starts to blur the clarity of Bernstein's
picture of a Progressive movement largely hostile to minorities.'03
In sum, either the NAACP leadership concluded that liberty of
contract would ultimately redound to African-Americans'
detriment, or they calculated that an alliance with northern, antiLochner, Progressives was more important than any marginal
advantage they could win by relying on Lochner. Either
possibility creates at least some tension with Bernstein's overall
narrative.
These arguments by no means completely refute Bernstein's
claim that, given the available options, Lochner was the
strongest tool minorities (and particularly African-Americans)
possessed. Still, the vulnerability of anti-discrimination legislation to liberty of contract reasoning makes it plausible to
conclude that equality advocates were ultimately correct to
downplay reliance on Lochner. At the very least, the fact that
the NAACP leadership-hardly unsophisticated advocatesdisdained that reasoning suggests that there must have been a
good reason for them to believe that Lochner was not the right
path to take. Indeed, the fact that Carolene Products ultimately
enacting such laws in the immediate post-Civil War period).
101. In other writing Bernstein appears to agree with this assessment.

See

BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE, supra note 21, at 113-14.

102. Similarly, at least some women's rights groups during this era favored protective
legislation for all workers, a position inconsistent with support for an extension of
Lochner's contractual liberty right to women. See, e.g., JULIE NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING
WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN: GENDER, LAW AND LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA AND NEW DEAL YEARS 187, 198 (2001) (cited in Bernstein, Feminist, supra note 10,
at 1975).
103. In a footnote Bernstein does acknowledge that some pro-civil rights
Progressives favored unions despite the latters' racism, on the theory that unionization
represented the best long-term hope for African-Americans' economic prospects (p. 52
n.108).
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provided a formula for protecting African-Americans' equality
rights while simultaneously preserving government's latitude to
enact anti-discrimination laws that regulated marketplace
choices ultimately confirms the correctness of their choice to
reject Lochner.

III. BACK TO THE FUTURE
The above critiques notwithstanding, there is much merit in
Bernstein's suggestion that Lochner is the ultimate precursor to
the modern substantive due process privacy cases. Indeed,
Lochner, by opening the way for the Meyer line of cases, the
cases protecting free speech, and the cases incorporating the
criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights, can be
understood as (very) indirectly paving the way for footnote
four's reconceptualization of these cases as, respectively, cases
protecting minorities, protecting the political process, and
recognizing the legitimacy of judicial protection of textuallybased constitutional rights.
The progression from robust judicial protection of
unenumerated rights to a more nuanced recognition that some
groups require special judicial protection from the legislative
free-for-all is being replayed in the modern era. The modern
privac cases-most notably the abortion cases and Lawrence v.
Texas' -have been subject to criticism that has never really
abated since Roe. That criticism has led commentators
sympathetic to those cases' results to argue for a recasting of
those rights as sounding in equality. This phenomenon has been
most pronounced in the abortion context: ever since Roe,
commentators sympathetic to the abortion right have argued
that that right was better understood as flowing from the
Constitution's commitment to women's equality."o' In the context
of sexuality, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence argued
that the Texas law banning same-sex sodomy was more
104. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
105. Most notably, before ascending to the Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
argued forcefully for understanding the abortion right as a right based in women's
equality. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985). She has continued to express this
view on the Court, albeit within the limits of the current doctrine's housing of the
abortion right in substantive due process. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
168, 184-85 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using equality language to describe the
importance of the abortion right).
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appropriately struck down as a violation of equal protection,
rather than as a violation of the majority's loosely-defined right
to private, consensual, non-commercial sexual conduct between
adults.10 The current fight over same-sex marriage rights is
replaying this debate, with some courts and commentators
sympathetic to the rights claim arguing that it should inhere in
equality guarantees rather than in an alleged "fundamental right
to marriage."1
Thus, just as in the Lochner era, a substantive right
recognized by courts has come under attack, and has generated
calls, not for reversing the results of all the cases decided under
that doctrine, but instead for their reconceptualization as
equality cases. The same arguments made in favor of this change
in the 1930's are heard today. It is argued that judicial
recognition of substantive rights is subjective, lacks a legitimate
grounding in judicial competence, and amounts to judicial
policymaking.'o On the other side of the ledger, advocates for an
equality approach claimed during the Lochner era and claim
today that such an approach respects legislative value choices
and simply requires the legislature to provide to the disfavored
group what it provides for the favored group."
106. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
107. E.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); See also, e.g., Nelson
Tebbe & Debra Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375
(2010) (arguing that the best doctrinal vehicle for same-sex marriage rights is the fundamental rights strand of equal protection).
108. But see Carlos Ball, Why Liberty Judicial Review is as Legitimate as Equality
Review: The Case of Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2011) (arguing
that equal protection review is no more cabined or objective than due process review);
Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection,124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011) (describing a
new, dignity-based, approach to rights protection).
109. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. City of New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111, 112-13
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not
forget today, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials would
impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door
to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few
to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might
be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure
to assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation."); Cruzan
v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292, 300 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Are there,
then, no reasonable and humane limits that ought not to be exceeded in requiring an
individual to preserve his own life? There obviously are, but they are not set forth in the
Due Process Clause. What assures us that those limits will not be exceeded is the same
constitutional guarantee that is the source of most of our protection-what protects us,
for example, from being assessed a tax of 100% of our income above the subsistence
level, from being forbidden to drive cars, or from being required to send our children to
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It remains to be seen how such calls for an equality
approach will be resolved. We are a long way from 1938, when
the Court could confidently presume that it had the competence
to determine when "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities" really existed, and thus justified more searching
judicial review."' But the larger point remains: what Lochner
teaches us is that a judicial doctrine can generate progeny that
morph into new doctrines, once the results under the original
doctrine are better understood with the passage of time.
At least this is one way a student could answer the opening
question.'

school for 10 hours a day, none of which horribles are categorically prohibited by the
Constitution. Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the
democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on
you and me.").
110. See, e.g., William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis
Standard of Equal Protection, 79 TULANE L. REv. 519, 521-23 (2005) (noting the Court's
inconsistent and unsteady application of footnote four's formula); see also Bruce
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985) (critiquing the
usefulness of footnote fours's "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities"
formula).
111. See text accompanying supra notes 3-4.

STOP THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S
EQUALITY
EQUALITY:
GENDER
CITIZENSHIP, (Linda C.

DIMENSIONS

OF

WOMEN'S

McClain' & Joanna L. Grossman,2
eds.). New York, Cambridge University Press. 2009. Pp.
450. $99.00.
Miranda McGowan'

Many civil rights scholars despair that the Equal Protection
Clause's success in securing women and minorities' formal
equality has come at the price of achieving substantive equality
for individuals without regard to their race or sex.4 In the service
1. Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University
School of Law.
2. Professor of Law, Hofstra University.
3. Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law.
4. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV, 1075, 1080 (2001) (arguing that
"[r]acial inequality is integral rather than peripheral to basic social processes, woven into
our cultural fabric rather than placed on top of it," but "equal protection doctrine,
however formulated" is unable "to transcend or overcome that inequality"); Guy-Uriel
E. Charles, Toward A New Civil Rights Framework, 30 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 353, 353
(2007) (arguing that "the civil rights movement is dead and . . . a racial malaise has set in"
because "we have reached a point of equilibrium that is destined to rigorously enforce
formal equality but never reach actual racial parity"); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1347 (1988) (writing that "the very terms used to proclaim
victory [in the civil rights movement] contain within them the seeds of defeat" and
"[e]qual opportunity law may have also undermined the fragile consensus against white
supremacy"); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 954 (1993) (arguing
that "the pursuit of colorblindness progressively reveals itself to be an inadequate social
policy if the ultimate goal is substantive racial justice" and noting that "[b]lacks continue
to inhabit a very different America than do whites"); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1050 (1978) (castigating equal protection
doctrine because "for as surely as the law has outlawed racial discrimination, it has
affirmed that Black Americans can be without jobs, have their children in all-black,
poorly funded schools, have no opportunities for decent housing, and have very little
political power, without any violation of antidiscrimination law"); Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 487-88 (2004) (arguing that "the suspect
classification label has made it more, rather than less, difficult for government to remedy

139

140

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 28:139

of "formal equality," for example, the Court has barred raceconscious measures to remedy past societal discrimination' or to
achieve integration.' Intentional discrimination alone violates
the principle of formal equality -policies or practices with
substantial disparate impact on the basis of race, sex, or national
origin do not. Indeed, the principle of formal equality can
prevent government officials from discarding ability tests
because they have a disparate impact on the basis of race.
the effects of hostility toward racial minorities in employment, voting, and other arenas"
and acts "as a barrier to programs designed to redress race discrimination"); Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991)
(arguing that the Supreme Court's use of colorblindness or formal equality fosters "white
racial domination"); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374,
375 (2007) (explaining that "[s]ince the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis,
the limits of the intent standard in remedying persistent racial inequities have been a
leading preoccupation" among civil rights scholars); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,
387 (1987) (discussing how "[t]he intent requirement is a centerpiece in an ideology of
equal opportunity that legitimizes the continued existence of racially and economically
discriminatory conditions and rationalizes the superordinate status of privileged whites");
Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1143 (1997) (explaining that "today
doctrines of heightened scrutiny function primarily to constrain legislatures from
adopting policies designed to reduce race and gender stratification, while doctrines of
discriminatory purpose offer only weak constraints on the forms of facially neutral state
action that continue to perpetuate the racial and gender stratification of American
society"); David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 935, 955-56 (1989) (arguing that the Court's adoption of the discriminatory
intent standard in Washington v. Davis signaled "a withdrawal from the front lines of
social change" and entails "a degree of infidelity" to the 14th Amendment's purpose of
ending the second-class citizenship of African Americans); Derrick A. Bell, Jr.,
Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523-24 (1980) (arguing that the equal protection doctrine offers little
assistance to African Americans hoping for an end to racial subordination because the
"interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it
converges with the interests of whites . . . [, and] the fourteenth amendment, standing
alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks").
5. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (striking city's
policy of requiring city contractors to award a proportion of subcontracts to minority
owned businesses because the city had not demonstrated that the paucity of minority
owned contractors was created by any "identified" acts of "discrimination").
6. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725,
747-48 (2007) (finding that school district's use of race to reduce racial concentration in
schools and ensure that racially concentrated housing patterns did not prevent nonwhite
students from attending district's most desirable schools violated the 14th Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause).
7. The reasoning is that officials intentionally base their decisions to discard such
tests on race because such tests fail to produce sufficient numbers of racial minority
groups eligible for a position or for a promotion. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673
(2009) (finding "the City chose not to certify the examination results because of the
statistical disparity based on race- [that is,] ... how minority candidates had performed
when compared to white candidates. . . . [and] [w]ithout some other justification, this
express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VII's command that employers cannot
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Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
regulates just state action, not private actors, leaving many
things that contribute to women's inequality outside the reach of
the Constitution and Congress to remedy.
In the 1970s, Kenneth Karst foresaw equality's limitations.
"[T]he formal guarantee of equal civil rights, necessary as it was
to achieving the full inclusion of all Americans in the national
community, [will] take us only partway toward" full inclusion.'
He urged courts and civil rights lawyers to think in terms of
guaranteeing equal citizenship status for all Americans. The
principle of equal citizenship requires that "[e]ach individual is
presumptively entitled to be treated by the organized society as a
respected, responsible, and participating member."'
As this definition implies, citizenship encompasses more
than formal membership in a society. According to Karst,
"citizenship .. . begins [with] the formal recognition of" equality,
but it "is also a principle of substance."10 As surely as formal
barriers deny equal citizenship to individuals, so too do
"substantive inequalities," which "effectively bar people from
full membership."" The state is not the only culprit in creating
castes of citizens-nongovernmental institutions have played
(and continue to play) a significant role in "segregating
American public life," and excludin members of some groups
from full inclusion in that public life.'
More recently, Reva Siegel has argued that the Nineteenth
Amendment might be a more powerful weapon than the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause for securing
substantive equality for women. She has documented that the
Nineteenth Amendment's purpose was to guarantee women's
equal status as citizens. It disrupted two powerful barriers to that
equal status that persisted under the Fourteenth Amendment.
First, the public/private distinction insulated most acts by private
citizens from Fourteenth Amendment liability and many from
federal regulation." Second, federalism prohibited Congress
from regulating marital and familial relationships.
take adverse employment actions because of an individual's race").
8. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 5 (1989).
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id. at 9.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 12.
13. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000); see also (pp. 25-26)
(Rogers M. Smith essay); (p. 383) (Elizabeth M. Schneider essay).
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Professors Karst and Siegel (and others) believe that
reframing issues of women's equality as issues of women's
inferior status as citizens could avoid some of the conceptual and
constitutional hurdles that have blocked progress toward
substantive sex equality. Specifically, women could argue, first,
that private persons, not just state actors, undermine their
citizenship status; second, that policies with disparate impact are
just as pernicious as disparate treatment; and, third, that
individuals have the right to demand certain positive
entitlements in addition to negative liberties to secure their
equal status as citizens.
In Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women's Citizenship,

twenty prominent feminist scholars explore what equal
citizenship for women would mean, what elements such a
concept would contain, and whether it could successfully further
the quest for substantive equality. The editors of this volume of
essays-Professors Linda McClain and Joanna Grossmanargue that a troubling gap persists between the discourse or
"formal commitments" to women's equality and the persisting
material inequalities of women's lives (p. 1). Equality suffers
from a number of drawbacks. First, women's claims for equality
often get hung up on beliefs that women are different from men
in ways that are relevant to their attaining equal pay, equal
participation in all types of work, and equal representation in
leadership positions in business and politics. 4 Whatever the
cause, women still shoulder the lion's share of caretaking
responsibility for children and home. They also dominate pinkcollar service jobs, while performing only a small proportion of
science and technology jobs. If women are different than men,
equality will not take women very far.
Second, equality can only be assessed according to some
baseline. For women, that benchmark is male. Feminists resist
using men as a benchmark for many reasons. Difference
feminists do so because they believe that women are different
from men and that some of women's traits are better. Some
disparage the goal of being like men as impossible or
unpalatable-Joan Williams has argued that men's superior
economic status has depended on women's contributions to
home and children." Those contributions have made it possible
14. For most purposes it does not matter whether these differences are biological or
constructed so long as they exist.
15.

JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 3,5 (2000).
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for most men to be "ideal workers"-workers who can put work
before home and family, secure in the knowledge that their
partners will manage the house, children, their social life, and
emergencies. Ideal workers often miss out on the joys of home
and family life."
But when a woman shoulders the role of "the ideal worker,"
she will sacrifice things that most men will not. According to
2010 Census data, high-earning women are about as twice as
likely as high-earning men never to have married." Such a
woman is also more than twice as likely to be divorced or
separated than a similar man." If she is married and has children,
she probably cannot leave the children home with dad while she
returns to work." Instead, a high-earning mother will outsource
the care and love of her children to paid help or extended family
members-and she will have to cope with the accompanying
guilt of having done so. Most women find the costs of being an
ideal worker too high.20 Consequently, many women put lofty
career goals on hold for at least a while. But this choice also

16. Id. at 4.
17. The exact statistic is that in 2010, 15.2% of women and 9.4% of men (over the
age of 15) who earned $100,000 or more have never married. U.S. Census Bureau,
Marital Status of People 15 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Personal Earnings, Race, and
Hispanic Origin, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2010, tbl.A1,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps20l0.html (last visited Oct.
6, 2011). That gap has narrowed since 2006, when 17% of women and 8.3% of men over
the age of 15 who earned $100,000 had never married. U.S. Census Bureau, Marital
Status of People 15 Years and Over, by Age, Sex, Personal Earnings, Race, and Hispanic
Origin, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2006, tbl.A1, http://www.
census.gov/population/www/socdemolhh-fam/cps2006.html (last visited, Oct. 6, 2011).
18. The exact figures are 13.5% of women earning $100,000 or more are divorced,
while 6% of such men are. See U.S. Census Bureau, Marital Status of People 15 Years and
Over: 2010, supra note 17, at tbl.A1.
19. In 2010, there were about 154,000 stay-at-home dads, according to U.S. Census
data; in comparison, there were about 5,020,000 stay-at home moms. In other words, moms
comprise about 97% of parents staying at home with children. Among families with
earnings over $100,000, the proportion of moms to dads in the stay at home parent population remains about the same-about 97% are women and 3% are men. U.S. Census
Bureau, Married Couple Family Groups With Children Under 15 by Stay-At-Home Status
of Both Spouses, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2010, tbl.FG8,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2010.htm
(last visited Oct.
6, 2011). But, between 2006 and 2010, the number of stay at home dads doubled in those
high earning families. In 2006, there were only 18,000 men in such families staying at
home with children, while 1,234,000 women stayed at home (that is, 98.6% of parents staying
home were moms). U.S. Census Bureau, Married Couple Family Groups With Children
Under 15 by Stay-At-Home Status of Both Spouses, and Race and Hispanic Origin of the
Reference Person, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2006, tbl.FG8,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2006.html (last visited, Oct.
6, 2011).
20. WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 38.
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costs dearly. Women who interrupt their careers for even a year
to stay home with young children suffer a permanent pay cut of
about 11%, while those who take off three years will take a
permanent pay cut of nearly 40%.2
Third, the United States Constitution limits equality's utility
in several different ways. Fourteenth Amendment rights shield
individuals from government action, not from private action.22
Indeed, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have read the
Fourteenth Amendment's "state action" requirement to restrict
Congress's power to punish private conduct that makes it harder
for others to exercise their civil rights.23 Also, the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits only state action that intentionally
discriminates against women. The Court defines intentional
discrimination narrowly-an action undertaken because of its
discriminatory effect on women. 24 Even when if it is obvious that
some policy will disadvantage women, a legislature may enact
the measure unless the legislature's very purpose was to
disadvantage women.
Finally, women cannot brandish the Fourteenth Amendment to demand government benefits. Most formal barriers to
women's equality fell decades ago. The main impediments
today-persisting job segregation, the lack of paid parental leave
(and the fathers' tendency to take less, if any, of it), affordable,
21. Miranda 0. McGowan, Engendered Differences 28 (Mar. 17, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript) (citing Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Carolyn Buck Luce, Off-Ramps
and On-Ramps: Keeping Talented Women on the Road to Success, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Mar. 2005, at 43, 46), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1361196).

22. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000). Some Supreme Court
decisions support reading the 14th Amendment to extend to some private actions. For
example, United States v. Guest upheld a criminal indictment of two private individuals
for violating 18 U.S.C. § 241, which prohibited conspiracies between "two or more
persons . . . to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or
enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States . . . ." 383 U.S. 745, 747 (1966) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964)). The
Supreme Court held that the indictment pled sufficient "state action" when "[o]ne of the
means of accomplishing the object of the conspiracy, according to the indictment, was
'By causing the arrest of Negroes by means of false reports that such Negroes had
committed criminal acts."' Id. at 756.
23. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
24. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 276 (1979).
25. The Supreme Court's decisions in both Morrison and Ricci v. DeStefano have
cast doubt on Congress's powers to address either race- or sex-based disparate impact.
Ricci held that a city violated Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-2(a)(1),
when it threw out the results of an employee-promotion test because it had a disparate
impact based on race. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673-74 (2009). The city's decision, the Court
reasoned, was because of race, and therefore was intentional discrimination in violation
of Title VII. Id. at 2674.
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high quality childcare, and reasonable accommodations for
pregnancy-will only fall if government takes affirmative steps
and private individuals make different choices.
In short, formal, legal equality is necessary but not sufficient
to attain substantive equality (p. 2).26 Substantive equality
requires dismantling major structural impediments to women's
full participation in all spheres of civic life. Harrison Bergeron,
Kurt Vonnegut's dystopic story of equality run amok, is a good
example. Vonnegut satirizes a society that elevates equality of
outcomes above all other values. Heavy weights encumber
ballerinas' legs, beautiful people wear hideous masks, headsets
blurt nonsense into the ears of intelligent people, and heavy
chains shackle the strong. The deadlock between formal equality
and substantive equality has many thinking that those looking to
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause for help
should look elsewhere. Is "citizenship" the right place to look?
Having full status as a citizen entitles a person to equal
status as other citizens and full inclusion into society. The
authors of these essays suggest that women's rights proponents
should consider insisting on women's rights to be full-fledged
citizens of their countries and the world community, rather than
pushing for women's "equality."2 8 They offer several reasons
why citizenship might be a more fruitful frame for demanding
substantive equality for women. In particular, some of the essays
in this volume argue that citizenship gives women grounds to
argue that laws with disparate impact undermine women's
citizenship as surely as laws that facially discriminate; that
private acts of discrimination as well as discriminatory state
action impinge on women's citizenship; and that citizenship gives
women grounds to demand positive entitlements as well as
freedom from government restraints. This review surveys these
arguments and then discusses the limitations of staking women's
claims to equal status on citizenship. The concept of citizenship
may reflect gender stereotypes to such a degree that it could
cause as much mischief as it avoids. Citizenship rights may also
26. See also (p. 255) (Martha Albertson Fineman essay) ("[F]ormal equality is
inevitably uneven equality because existing inequalities abound throughout society, and
a concept of equality that is merely formal in nature cannot adequately address them.").
27. See generally Kurt Vonnegut, Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE
MONKEY HOUSE 7 (2010).
28. Not all of the contributors to this volume agree. See, e.g., (p. 252) (Martha
Albertson Fineman essay) (questioning whether the concept of "equal citizenship" is
helpful as citizenship confines the universe of persons who are meant to be equal, and
citizenship itself connotes equality).
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vary from country to country, such that citizenship might prove
more useful to achieving substantive equality in some countries
than in others.
Some of the essays in this volume express doubt that
recasting the women's movement in terms of citizenship will
further the cause of substantive gender equality. This review will
discuss how the doubters might have the better end of the
argument. First, to profitably reframe women's claims as claims
for equal status as citizens, feminists would have to persuade
people to accept their concept of citizenship. That concept has
no accepted meaning. The essays themselves reveal different and
contested meanings. Second, gender stereotypes infect current
concepts of citizenship. To reframe arguments for parity as
claims for equal citizenship status could be to fall prey to those
stereotypes. Third, recasting the feminist movement as a
movement for women's equal status as citizens requires more
than a simple change in vocabulary or rhetoric. The current
impediments to achieving substantive equality have their
foundations in differences in ideology that sharply divide
Americans, and resolving these conflicts will not be easy
whatever the rhetoric. Finally, and as Martha Fineman writes in
her chapter, the concept of equality may not have run its course.
Equality has achieved a great deal in a relatively short time,
perhaps because the basic idea of equality lies at the foundation
of the rule of law-that like cases should be treated alike.2 9
This review essay will proceed as follows. Part I summarizes
Gender Equality's main working definition of citizenship and the
aspects of citizenship and gender equality explored in each
section of the book. Part II critically examines whether
citizenship could propel the movement for substantive gender
equality, with examples from Gender Equality to illustrate how
arguments from citizenship could help this cause. Part III
explains how gender stereotypes infuse the concept of citizenship. Drawing on research into cognitive frames, this section
explains that a shift to citizenship could actually impede progress
toward substantive gender equality. Part IV concludes on a more
hopeful note. For citizenship to lose its gendered cast,
stereotypes about families and familial roles must change. Such
roles have changed dramatically over the past 40 years. They
continue to do so. Arguments for women's equality can take
29. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 208 (rev. ed. 2005) ("The rule of law also
implies the precept that similar cases be treated similarly.").
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much of the credit for these changes. The fight from here on out,
however, will have to be for gender equality, not just women's
equality. Norms of masculinity must change, and gender equality
proponents will have to persuade men that they will benefit in
the process.
I. EQUAL CITIZENSHIP STATUS
Gender Equality organizes twenty essays on citizenship into
several
different
dimensions - constitutional
citizenship,
democratic citizenship, social citizenship, sexual and
reproductive citizenship, and global citizenship.
In this book's introduction, Professors McClain and
Grossman describe T. H. Marshall's' concept of citizenship as "a
status bestowed on those who are full members of a community.
All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights
and duties with which the status is endowed" (p. 8).3' This focus
on status, argue Professors McClain and Grossman, "provides an
opening to investigate not just formal assertions of equal status
but also more substantive questions about whether community
members truly have the same rights and opportunities, or
participate on equal terms" (p. 8). "[E]qual citizenship conveys"
the "goal[] of equal status for all members of society and its
ideals of inclusion, membership, and belonging" (p. 1).32
Citizenship embraces the whole range of "rights, benefits, duties,
and obligations that members of any society expect to share"
and the goals of "inclusion, belonging, participation, and civic
membership" (p. 2).
This general concept implies three conditions that
determine whether individuals possess equal status as citizens of
a nation. Citizens must possess, first, equal civil rights, (for
example, the right to contract and hold property); second, equal
political rights, (for example, the right to vote or serve on juries);
and third, equal social rights.
T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1950).
Quoting T.H. MARSHALL, CLASS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT:
ESSAYS BY T.H. MARSHALL 84 (1964); see also KARST, supra note 8, at 3 ("The principle
of equal citizenship, as I use the term, means this: Each individual is presumptively
entitled to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member.. . . the principle forbids the organized society to treat the individual as a
member of an inferior or dependent caste or nonparticipant.").
32. See also KARST, supra note 8, at 3 (emphasizing that the principle of equal
citizenship "centers on those aspects of equality that are most closely bound to the sense
of self and the sense of inclusion in a community").
30.
31.
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The twenty chapters in this collection cover many disparate
topics related to these categories. The brief summary provided
here necessarily flattens the subtleties of each chapter's
arguments. These twenty essays are grouped into the five parts
of the volume-constitutional citizenship, political citizenship,
social citizenship, sexual citizenship, and global citizenship. Each
chapter of Gender Equality is interesting in its own right, and all
of the chapters are worth reading by those who care about
women's equality in the United States and worldwide.
Constitutional citizenship refers to civil and political rights

and the "role that constitutions play in fostering women's equal
citizenship and forbidding" sex discrimination (p. 15). This
section's essays explore why citizenship has played such a minor
role in the Supreme Court's sex equality jurisprudence (p. 23)
(Rogers M. Smith essay); how the immigration and
naturalization process in the United States continues to reflect
and reinforce traditional gender norms and roles (p. 39) (Kerry
Abrams essay); whether the American bill of rights was built on
communitarian principles as well as liberal individualist ideals
(p. 60) (Gretchen Ritter essay); and whether it is possible for a
country to promote gender equality if it also permits individuals
to practice religions that, for example, give women and men
different rights in marriage and divorce (p. 83) (Beverley Baines
essay) or require women to wear distinctive and modest garb (p.
107) (Mary Anne Case essay).
Politicalcitizenship refers to political rights. The chapters in
this section discuss how traditional models of citizenship are
primarily built around masculine activities and how arguing for
equal citizenship status might change that. For example, one
chapter explores whether reframing abortion as implicating
women's citizenship status could transform the abortion debate
from the current, seemingly intractable conflict between women
and fetuses' rights (p. 154) (Nancy J. Hirschmann essay). Two
chapters in this section explore why so few women hold political
office. One of them investigates whether sex quotas for political
office increase the number of women representatives and
meaningfully improve women's "representation" (p. 174) (Anne
Peters & Stefan Suter essay). The other describes the author's
study of why some countries elect significantly more women to
high political office than others (p. 201) (Eileen McDonagh
essay). Three women-led anti-war movements are another
chapter's subject. This chapter uncovers the traditional gender
stereotypes that underlie concepts of good citizenship. These
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stereotypes, the chapter explains, both facilitate and undermine
these movements' tactics and effectiveness (p. 131) (Kathryn
Abrams essay).
Social citizenship refers to the "material preconditions for
effective participation in society" (p. 17). Joanna Grossman
writes of the "importance of paid work to women's full
participation in society.. ." (p. 239). American law denies

women full social citizenship, she argues, because it denies
women the right to reasonable accommodation of the physical
limitations being pregnant sometimes impose on them. Another
describes how the American tax system tends to decrease
women's status as citizens (p. 267) (Martha T. McCluskey essay).
Martha Fineman's chapter describes how she is less optimistic
about citizenship's possibilities for gender equality (p. 251). She
is concerned that citizenship's orientation toward activities in the
public sphere will distract from what she considers to be the
main determinant of women's inequality-the status quo's
failure to recognize humanity's essential vulnerability. Ignoring
vulnerability has pushed the issue into the private realm, where
women shoulder the lion's share of the burden of caring for
those vulnerable people.
Sexual and reproductive citizenship refers to questions about

the legitimacy of government interest in regulating families,
sexuality, and reproduction. One chapter describes how "sexual
outlaws" (gay men and lesbians, sexually assertive single
women) "have demanded inclusion" in mainstream life and have
"begun to revise and expand the meaning of citizenship by
claiming their rights" (p. 291) (Brenda Cossman essay). "In so
doing, they have contributed to the politicization of the ...
private sphere" (p. 291), which may have encouraged some
Christian organizations to encourage married partners to
celebrate their sexuality and become more adventurous.
Another chapter questions whether queer theory has been too
quick to celebrate sexual transgression as always liberating, and
gender theory to condemn sex as invariably oppressive (p. 307)
(Maxine Eichner essay). Two chapters. focus on reproduction.
One argues that the usual view of infertility as a private, medical
problem that implicates only negative liberties ignores how
crucial parenthood is to citizenship. Parenthood accords people
full "'recognition' by one's fellow citizens" and "full membership
in the civic community" (p. 327) (Mary Lyndon Shanley essay).
33.

Quoting JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN

CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR
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The decision whether or not to have children is crucial to
individual identity and our concept of the "good life" (p. 327).
The second discusses the importance of reproductive rights to
women's citizenship (p. 345) (Barbara Stark essay), describing
their codification in international treaties and conventions (p.
346-50), and noting how bearing the next generation of citizen
has traditionally been considered to be the role of women
citizens (pp. 345-46). In particular, this chapter considers the
effect of both pro- and anti-natalist policies on women's status
and the implications of laws permitting or banning sex selective
abortions.
Global citizenship, the volume's final section, explores how
international human rights norms have sometimes undermined
women's status as citizens and sometimes sparked successful
feminist movements. For example, Regina Austin examines
three documentaries about the murders of more than 300
women over a twelve-year period in Ciudad Juarez, a city on the
United States/Mexico border (p. 359). Rampant criminalitydrugs, prostitution, human smuggling, and a high rate of
emigration of women from their homes and families in Mexico's
interior-made the women of Ciudad Juarez vulnerable to their
serial murder (pp. 362-64). Many of the women who were killed
were newcomers and suspected prostitutes. Police gave low
priority to investigating their murders. Border crime stretched
the city's criminal justice system nearly to the breaking point and
powerful drug lords and human smugglers corrupted it with
bribes and threats. Austin describes that these women's families
demanded justice for their loved ones by portraying these
women's murders as a denial of citizenship-the right to safety,
to justice, to move freely within Mexico, and the right "to
peace ... for families" (p. 371).'

How domestic violence stopped being just a private, family
issue and became a human rights issue" that impairs women's
full participation in society is the subject of other chapters in this
section. One argues that framing domestic violence as depriving
women of full citizenship is crucial to its eradication (p. 378)
(Elizabeth M. Schneider essay). Another documents the
progress toward achieving women's equal rights as citizens in
Muslim countries where citizenship rights are filtered through a
religious law that conceives of men's and women's roles as
INCLUSION 100 (1991).

34.

Alteration in original.
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essentially different (p. 390) (Anisseh Van Engeland-Nourai
essay). The final chapter describes how global human rights
norms have supported grassroots efforts to push for women's
equal status as citizens in many different countries (p. 409)
(Deborah M. Weissman essay). This chapter warns feminists that
the United States has on several occasions used the denial of
women's rights or the abuse of women as an excuse for invading
a country or to increase the United States' power and influence
in that country (p. 420-25). Feminist human rights activists must
take care not to unwittingly become tools of United States
foreign policy.
Having briefly summarized the essays in this collection, let
me now discuss this collection's main thesis-that staking
women's claims to equality on their rights as citizens could
alleviate some of the perennial problems in the fight for
women's equality.
II. DO CLAIMS BASED ON EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
STATUS AVOID THE LIMITATIONS OF ARGUMENTS
FOR EQUALITY?
Professors McClain and Grossman argue in their introduction to this collection that at least three main legal barriers
have stymied progress toward women's equality in the United
States, and basing women's claims on citizenship could remove
these barriers. First, only intentional discrimination based on a
person's sex violates the Equal Protection Clause. Policies with
disparate impact do undermine a group's citizenship rights and
their status as citizens.
Second, the Equal Protection Clause applies only to the
state or state officials, so women cannot sue private persons for
constitutional violations. This state action requirement also
denies Congress the authority to remedy private discrimination,"
unless state officials have a hand in the discrimination36 or the
discrimination substantially affects interstate commerce. 37
Private persons can, however, affect the citizenship status of
others, much as private acts can impose badges and incidents of
slavery.38
35. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598. 621 (2000); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
36. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966).
37. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
38. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968).
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Third, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, at most,
freedom from state interference with individual choice. The
Court has been reluctant to rule that the Fourteenth
Amendment creates entitlements to state services.3 9 Claims of
equal citizenship status might, however, provide a basis for
claiming entitlements to certain state services or policies.
None of the chapters in this volume discuss where textual
authority might be found in the Constitution for the guarantee of
equal citizenship status. A few possibilities include the
Nineteenth Amendment, as Reva Siegel has documented how
this amendment was intended to guarantee women's equal
citizenship status,40 and the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which could empower Congress to legislate to
remedy the unequal citizenship status of some groups. The
Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery has been interpreted to
include badges and incidents of slavery, and unequal citizenship
status might represent such a badge.
A. WOMEN'S CLAIMS FOR EQUAL CITIZENSHIP STATUS COULD
MAKE POLICIES WITH DISPARATE IMPACT AGAINST WOMEN
CONSTITUTIONALLY VULNERABLE
In the first essay Rogers Smith points that the Supreme

Court rarely discusses women's citizenship in its sex equality
cases. Citizenship lies at the margins of women's equality
jurisprudence, Smith argues, because laws with disparate impact
are usually constitutional. Using the lens of equal protection, the
Court sees the harms to women resulting from policies or laws
with disparate impact as being caused by some factor other than
their sex. According to Smith, most discrimination is invisible to
the Court, as most formal barriers to women's equality have
been demolished (pp. 23-24). Many laws, policies, and practices
with disparate impact, however, still impede women from fullfledged citizenship.
Smith presents United States v. Morrison as his main
example of the Court's refusal to acknowledge how disparate

39. There are limited exceptions to this rule, most prominently, the state's
obligation to provide an indigent person with assistance of counsel. State and federal
courts must also waive most court filing fees if a person is too poor to pay them.
40. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 947, 968 (2002) [hereinafter Siegel, She
the People] ("I argue for reading the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments together
because the two Amendments are linked in subject matter concern: each secures
constitutional protection for values of equal citizenship.").
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impact undermines women's citizenship. In that case, the Court
nullified major parts of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), which had given women a "[f]ederal civil rights cause
of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender"
(p. 25).41 Citing the Civil Rights Cases4 2 for the proposition that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discriminatory state
action, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that Congress lacked power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to create such a
cause of action against private individuals. His citation to the
Civil Rights Cases was notable, as the Court had not relied upon
it as authority for almost 40 years. Chief Justice Rehnquist
conceded that the congressional record had indeed
demonstrated "pervasive bias in various state justice systems
against victims of gender-motivated violence" (p. 26). But,
VAWA's cause of action did not remedy constitutional
violations by these state officials-it made an end run around
them. Smith argues that VAWA protected women's status as
citizens by combating private violence against women, thereby
increasing women's freedom, autonomy, full civic participation,
and ability to engage in citizenship activities pp. (26-27). No
Justices in Morrison, however, so much as mentioned that
VAWA would "combat behavior that had long contributed to
women's subordination in their civic roles" (p. 27).
Nor does Nevada v. Hibbs" mention citizenship. Hibbs is

the late Chief Justice's other opinion about Congress's power to
promote sex equality. There, in an apparent about-face, Chief
Justice Rehnquist upheld the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) as validly enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment.
FMLA gave parents the right to 12 weeks of unpaid leave from
work to care for a newborn child.45 The Chief Justice was
persuaded that Congress had solid evidence that states had
continued "to rely on invalid gender stereotypes in ... the
administration of [familial] leave benefits."46 Smith objects that
FMLA's meager, unpaid leave provisions can hardly be expected
to change the fact that women still carry "disproportionate
responsibilit[y] for family and household care" (p. 32). Smith
argues that were Congress to legislate to guarantee women's
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Quoting 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994).
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Quoting United States v. Morrison, 528 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000).
Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
Id. at 724 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (1993)).
Id. at 730.
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"full citizenship stature" 47 it could justify "a massive
restructuring of" the provision of "child care, housework, and
marketplace employment" (p. 33). Women still shoulder most
childcare and housework, and that fact, Smith argues, limits their
economic, political, and social status (pp. 32-33).
However much laws and policies with disparate impact
undermine women's status as citizens, Smith doubts that the
Court is the right institution to attack such laws and policies (pp.
34-35). He worries that disparate impact challenges would mire
the Court in a deep morass of policymaking (p.36), much like the
one the Court fell into in the 1970s. Then, district courts found
themselves running school districts, mental hospitals, and
prisons. The same institutional constraints on court power and
democratic legitimacy that hampered the courts' success in
running those institutions, Smith argues, would likely plague
courts today if they routinely evaluated the constitutionality of
laws with disparate impact.
Smith may be too quick to conclude that disparate impact
would ensnare courts in policymaking inconsistent with their
role. In his article, "In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination
Principle," Paul Brest argued that the "anti-discrimination
principle" encompassed one kind of state-sponsored discrimination that had fallen beneath the radar screen of the Court's
intentional discrimination jurisprudence: policymakers' selective
indifference to the burdens their policies impose on people of
color.4 8 Brest could have added women, too. Because of
legislatures' selective indifference, they may overlook the costs
that laws with significant disparate impact impose on women and
other minority groups.
Scrutinizing laws with disparate impact, moreover, does not
inevitably force the court to intrude on legislative turf. The
Court could, for example, strike laws with significant disparate
impact on the basis of race or sex if a legislature has not
specifically considered the law's disparate impact and concluded
that, despite its disparate impact, the law was still a rational way
to achieve particular policy aims. Such a test would be similar to
clear statement rules that the Court has adopted in its sovereign
immunity cases.49 Were the Court to strike a law with disparate
47.
48.
L. REv.
49.

Quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV.
1, 7-8 (1976).
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 56 (1996) (quoting
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impact on such grounds, a legislature could re-enact the law after
laying the factual groundwork to support the legislation's
importance despite the costs of its disparate impact, or it could
consider different policies with less disparate impact. Sending a
law back to the legislature does two useful things. It spotlights
the law's disparate impact, which gives interest groups an
opportunity to weigh in on the law's costs to their group; and it
forces the legislature to face up to the law's disparate impact, its
costs, and either to justify the disparate impact in light of other
benefits or to consider different alternatives."o In all cases, the
Court's action forces the legislature to consider the harms to the
group in its deliberations.
Even if the Court did not agree that the principle of equal
citizenship status called the constitutionality of laws with
disparate impact into question, that principle might moderate
the Court's growing hostility to disparate impact claims. Two
years ago, the Court held in Ricci v. DeStefano that the City of
New Haven violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally discriminating against white firefighters when it
discarded a promotion test because it had a racially disparate
impact on African Americans and Latinos." When the City
discarded the test because too few African Americans and
Latinos passed the test, its decision was based on race. The
Court's analysis in that case called into question the
constitutionality of any government attempts to avoid using
policies, tests, and practices with disparate impact; indeed, Title
VII's prohibition against disparate impact by private companies
could also be constitutionally vulnerable. But the principle of
equal citizenship status might persuade the Court to back away
from declaring disparate impact law unconstitutional.

Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1989)) ("Congress may abrogate the States'
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.") .
50. Paul Brest made a similar suggestion to cure the Palmer v. Thompson
situation-where there is evidence that discriminatory animus motivated the legislature,
but the law formally has no disparate impact. Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An
Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 SUPR. CT. REv. 95.
He argued that the Court should strike laws when evidence demonstrates that discriminatory animus motivated a law's passage. Id. at 130-31. True, a legislature might just
reenact the legislation and try to conceal its discriminatory animus better the second time
around. Forcing the legislature to reenact the law still forces it to articulate race or sex
neutral purposes for its action (which it might lack), and a reenacted law lies under a
cloud of suspicion of illicit motivation if no new compelling reasons for its passage can be
cited. Id. at 125-27.
51. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2678-79 (2009).
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Joanna Grossman argues that the United States'
indifference to laws and policies with disparate impact on
pregnant women undermines women's full social citizenship (p.
240). Pregnancy, she argues, can sometimes temporarily
interfere with a woman's ability to work. Title VII guarantees
pregnant women only formal equality-an employer may not
assume that pregnancy or impending motherhood limits a
woman's ability or commitment to work. Employers also
shoulder a relatively light duty to reasonably accommodate the
work limitations pregnancy or childbirth may imposeemployers must only accommodate such limitations if and to the
extent that it already reasonably accommodates other temporary
disabilities.52 Many employers do in fact provide such leaves to
employees who are temporarily disabled from work. Some lower
courts, however, have further limited the usefulness to pregnant
women of this reasonable accommodation aspect of Title VII.
Some have held employers only to a duty of reasonable
accommodation of pregnancy if they accommodate temporary
disabilities due to off-the-job injuries.
Many pregnant women want only relatively minor
accommodations-temporary relief from heavy lifting, changes
in work schedules to accommodate morning sickness or to
relieve women from late shifts, etc.-not a leave from work
entirely (pp. 245-46). Federal statutes provide no help,
Grossman contends because they do not give a woman the right
to reasonable work accommodations (pp. 245-46). Many lower
courts have also read Title VII's accommodation requirement to
bar claims by women that neutral policies have a disparate
impact on pregnant workers (pp. 246-47). Only the most
stringent work requirements, such as a policy that denies all
workers any leave during the first year of employment, have
fallen to disparate impact challenge.
Grossman
argues that the lack of pregnancy
accommodations undermines women's full status as citizens.
Work has a "multifaceted" relationship to citizenship (p. 237). A
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2011) (providing that "women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work").
53. U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991). But see
Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 861-62 (5th Cir. 2002) (dismissing a
disparate impact challenge to a policy that limited an employee's leave to three days
within the first ninety days of employment).
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person's work affects her self-conception, the conceptions others
have of her, her relationships, her dignity. Work also gives her
the means to exercise her independence and a forum where she
can discuss politics and national and world events with others (p.
237). "[A]ccess to decent, paid work is one measure of a
society's commitment to equality and its success in integrating all
citizens as full participants in society" (p. 237). As Judith Shklar
has written, "We are citizens only if we 'earn"' (p. 237).54
Equal access to paid work has increased women's status as
citizens by making economic independence possible and
permitting women to choose to work either outside or inside the
home. Yet, claims of pregnancy discrimination have soared over
the last decade and a half." Courts have limited Title VII's
protections for pregnant workers further by refusing to permit
most women's disparate impact challenges. More data about
pregnant workers would strengthen this chapter's argument that
women's equal status as citizens depends on pregnancy
accommodations, such as how commonly pregnant women need
light-duty assignments or how commonly pregnancy complications require women to take temporary leave from work.
Statistics indicating pregnant women's vulnerability to firing or
demotion certainly suggest discriminatory intent toward
pregnant workers. But such discrimination could reflect
employers' stereotypes about a mother's commitment to work,
rather than annoyance over a minor work accommodation.
Kerry Abrams's chapter, Becoming a Citizen: Marriage,
Immigration, and Assimilation, argues that federal law governing

permanent United States residency primarily benefits men.
Skilled workers-people with formal training or post-secondary
degrees-receive most employment-based green cards, and most
skilled immigrant workers are men. The majority of women
receive green cards derivatively through their husbands, and the
United States does not automatically award spouses green cards.
A green-card-holding spouse must sponsor his or her spouse.
Sponsorship is optional, and it imposes a heavy support
obligation on the sponsoring spouse that survives divorce. A
spouse must swear that he or she can support his or her spouse
at least at a level one and a quarter times the federal poverty line

54. Quoting SHKLAR, supra note 33, at 67.
55. U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Pregnancy Discrimination Charges
EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997-FY 2010, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/
enforcement/pregnancy.cfm (last visited Aug. 15, 2011).
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(p. 53). No income earned by the sponsored spouse counts
toward this amount.
The structure of sponsorship makes sponsored spouses
vulnerable to exploitation and coercion. The threat not to
sponsor can keep a wife in an abusive relationship. A husband
can refuse to sponsor his wife and either leave her in the home
country or force her to live illegally in the United States.
Congress recognized that immigration law puts many women at
the mercy of their husbands, and the Violence against Women
Act of 1994 created exception to spousal sponsorship if a person
can prove that her spouse has "battered" her or "subjected" her
"to extreme cruelty" (p. 55)." VAWA's requirement subjects

women to further indignities, Abrams argues, by extending
residency to women because of their victimhood, not their value
as potential citizens (pp. 56-57).
United States immigration law reinforces women's inferior
status in other ways, Abrams argues. It encourages green card
recipients to perform traditional gender roles within marriages.
Green cards' skilled work requirement disproportionately
screens out many foreign women who were denied equal
educational opportunities in their home countries. The spousal
support obligation encourages a traditional model of marriage,
which increases dependent spouses' vulnerability. The
sponsoring spouse's income alone counts toward the obligation.
None of a recipient spouse's own earnings count.
Abrams proposes three solutions. First, the United States
should eliminate the sponsorship requirement-spouses of
persons who receive employment-based green cards should
automatically be eligible to apply for a green card without
spousal consent. Second, the United States should either
eliminate the support requirement or base the support
requirement on total family income. The latter would encourage
spouses to work outside the home for pay, which would decrease
their dependency. Finally, she argues that childcare should
qualify as a skilled work category, and employers should be able
to sponsor an immigrant if they can prove they are unable to find
an American to provide childcare.
Abrams' first suggestion gives the most pause. In many
cities, it is claimed that finding a nanny is hard, and Abrams'
suggestion implies that this is her assumption. Is it the case,
56.

Quoting 8 U.S.C.

§1430(a) (2008).
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however, that American women shun the task of taking care of
others' children? Quite the opposite would seem to be true, if
preschool and kindergarten teachers are any guide. Finding a
nanny at minimum wage is certainly tough, as the average wage
for nannies in major metropolitan areas such as New York, Los
Angeles, and Washington, D.C. is over $16 per hour. At first
blush, it might sound high, but it works out to about $33,280 per
year on a forty-hour week-barely a living wage in these
communities." It is certainly not so high that it indicates a
profound shortage of nannies, particularly as those who cannot
afford full-time, one-on-one care for their children have other
childcare options, such as in-home daycare, institutional daycare,
and preschool.
B. CITIZENSHIP PROVIDES A BASIS FOR DEMANDING POSITIVE
ENTITLEMENTS

More American women vote than men, but women hold
only 15% of the seats in the House of Representatives (pp. 201,
202) (Eileen McDonagh essay) and seventeen of the 100 seats in
the Senate.5 ' No woman has ever been president, and only two
women, the late Geraldine Ferraro and Sarah Palin, have been
on her party's presidential ticket. Among democracies, the
United States ranks eighty-third out of 118 countries in the
proportion of women who hold public office (Table 9.1, p. 203).
Only in Ireland, Greece and France do women hold a smaller
proportion of their national legislature's seats (p. 203). Rwanda
leads the world-in 2006, women held almost 49% of the seats in
its national legislature (p. 203). Sweden comes in second with
45%; the other Scandinavian countries follow in fourth, fifth,
and sixth place-Norway, Finland, and Denmark respectively (p.
203). The Netherlands holds seventh place (p. 203).
Two chapters in this volume address women's
representation in national office. Representation, Discrimination,
and Democracy: A Legal Assessment of Gender Quotas in

Politics, by Anne Peters and Stefan Suter, discusses sex-quotas
for political office, which about 100 countries throughout the
world have implemented (p. 176). "Sex quotas" vary from
57. International Nanny Association, 2011 InternationalNanny Association Salary
and Benefits Survey, http://www.nanny.org/document.doc?id=7 (last visited Nov. 20,
2011) (reporting results of 2010 salary survey).
58. JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMBERSHIP IN THE 111TH
CONGRESS: A PROFILE 2 '(December 27, 2010), available at http://www.senate.gov/
CRSReports/crs-publish.cfmpid=%260BL%29PL%3B%3DOA.
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voluntary "soft targets" to specific constitutional provisions
reserving some parliamentary seats for women only, and they
are not equally effective. Citizenship and Women's Election to
Political Office: The Power of Gendered Public Policies, by

Eileen McDonagh, explores why some western democracies
have a strikingly higher proportion of women holding national
political office than others (p. 201). Both chapters agree that
gender quotas help ensure women's equal status as citizens,
because such policies communicate that women belong in
positions of power (pp. 199-200, 207).
Peters and Suter, however, argue counterintuitively that
quotas have only modestly increased the number of women
serving in national parliament: "The average level of
representation for women in political bodies in countries with
electoral quotas is only slightly higher than the worldwide
average of 18.4 percent of female parliamentarians" (p. 197).59
Peters and Suter explain that quotas come in several different
varieties. Not all are, well, quotas. Furthermore, quotas are most
effective in parliamentary systems with proportionate
representation. The most effective quotas, furthermore, specify
the minimum percentage of women to be included on a party
candidate list and specify women's placement on such lists (p.
198). Enforcement, finally, makes or breaks quota schemes (p.
198). France's 50% quota, for example, requires parties to
submit "zippered" candidate lists-a list that alternates male and
female candidates"-or have their public campaign-funding cut.
Similarly, Spain has a 40% quota and specifies that women
comprise at least 40% of candidates in each tranche of 5 posts on
a list. Noncompliant lists will not be placed on the ballot (p. 177
n.19).
The heart of Peters and Suter's chapter scrutinizes whether
sex quotas improve "representation" in electoral bodies. Here,
59. McDonagh concurs: "[T~he net gain of gender quotas for democracies is a
percentage increase of 3.929 percent" (p. 224).
60. The efficacy of France's quota seems surprising in light of McDonagh's statistic
that women held only 12% of the seats in the national legislature in 2006. France,
however, first adopted a quota system in 2000, and it did not initially require party
candidate lists to alternate men and women (a "zippered" list). Consequently, parties
placed many women candidates near the bottom of candidate lists, and few were elected.
"The number of female deputies [in the French National Assembly] increased" from
10.9% in 1997 to just 12.3%" in 2002. Priscilla L. Southwell & Courtney P. Smith,
Equality of Recruitment: Gender Parity in French National Assembly Elections, 44 Soc.
Sci. J. 83, 85 (2007). In 2007, France changed its scheme to ensure women's placement on
parties' lists (p. 177 n.16).
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the authors interestingly and usefully parse the meaning of
"representation." They argue that if women representatives
actually represent women's interests, concerns, and needs better
than men, then quotas create "substantive" representation (p.
190). Quotas could also create "parity" of representation if
proportionate sex representation is inherently good in and of
itself (p. 192). Finally, quotas could create "symbolic"
representation by creating the image that women belong in
power (p. 194). The "absence of women [political leaders]
reinforces strong ... assumptions about [women's] inferiority,"
Peters and Suter argue (p. 194). More women in "elected
assemblies ... more powerful[ly] and more visib[ly] assert[s]
women's equality with men than changing the composition of
the professions." Women who visibly possess political power not
only counter traditional stereotypes but also "raise female
aspirations," encourage other women to enter politics, and
broaden women's "career and life choices." (p. 194).
"Substantive representation" is a nonstarter according to
Peters and Suter. It is not true "that women ... have specific
interests and needs" that women politicians also possess (p. 190).
There is no "women's" position on most issues, and the "gender
gap" between men and women's positions is usually small (pp.
194-96). Second, the related idea that women have different
leadership styles (more bottom-up than authoritarian), skills
(more empathetic and better listeners), and values (more
cooperative and altruistic) (p. 190) "ressurect[s] dormant gender
stereotypes" (pp. 191-92). This rationale undermines women
political leaders-powerful women are "deviant," and softness is
weakness (p. 191).
Furthermore, parity standing alone violates the principle of
democratic accountability. It is incoherent to suggest that a
woman can be held accountable for who she is.
Generally, a woman cannot be held accountable for what she
is, but for what she does. But how can elected women carry an
additional responsibility to represent women? Is there a
mandate of difference attached to women politicians, even in
the absence of mechanisms to establish special accountability?
(p. 193).
Requiring women to carry the additional responsibility of
representing women unfairly burdens women leaders. It also
violates the idea that leaders should be accountable to all
citizens (p. 193).
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Peters and Suter are much more positive about symbolic
representation. Sex parity in power achieves more than proportionate representation. "Underneath the deceptive simplicity of
the arrangements for parity democracy lies the much more
complex function of representation. Because politics is ... about
self-image ... gender parity has a powerful" symbolic meaning
(p. 194). Substantial numbers of women in national leadership
reflects women's equal status and "potentially" could multiply
"the rights and the position of all women" (p. 194). Indeed, all
by themselves, debates about gender quotas improve women's
status simply by elevating the issue of women's leadership to
national importance (p. 194).
Eileen McDonagh studies the issue of women's
representation from a slightly different angle. She describes her
regression analysis that shows that Western democracies without
strong social welfare policies tend to elect fewer women to
higher office. The proportion of women elected to public office,
Professor McDonagh argues, depends on whether a country
associates maternal characteristics with good government.
Countries that have had women monarchs and those that have
strong social welfare policies have elected more women to
national public office. According to 2006 data, western
democracies that lead in the proportion of women elected to
office include Sweden (45%), 61 Costa Rica (39%),62 Norway
(38%),63 Finland (37.5%),' Denmark (37%),61 the Netherlands
(37%) 66 and Spain (36%).67 The United States has had no
monarch, woman or otherwise, it is one of only two
industrialized democracies that has not had "any form of social
or biological citizenship" in the form of welfare provisions,
gender quotas, or a hereditary monarchy in which a woman can
ascend to the throne." Women hold 16% of the seats in

61. See Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliaments, http://www.
ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif3ll206.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2011) (providing 2006
statistics).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. McDonagh also lists France, but France adopted gender quotas after her study
was completed. See supra note 60.
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Congress. Japan is the other such country. There, women held
about 11% of the seats in its national legislature."
Social welfare policies, McDonagh argues, signify women's
legitimate place in power and in politics (pp. 221-22). They also
"free women to enter the paid workforce" and "provide public
sector jobs that disproportionately employ women."" Women's
increased participation in paid work changes their political
interests and makes them ardent supporters of the ver same
policies that enabled them to work outside of the home. Their
changing political views, in turn, create an ideological gender
gap among parties that can be exploited by promoting more
women candidates (p. 222).
C. PRIVATE PERSONS -AS WELL AS PUBLIC POLICIESUNDERMINE WOMEN'S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP STATUS

As the earlier discussion in Part A explained, the Civil
Rights Cases held that Congress had the power to pass laws
preventing discrimination by state actors, but not by private
persons, because only state action violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the 1960s, the Court
skirted this restriction on Congress's remedial power by
construing Congress's commerce power generously enough to
cover discrimination in public accommodations7 4 and its section
five, Fourteenth Amendment powers generously enough to
cover private conspiracies to deny an individual's civil rights
because of his race. United States v. Morrison, however, revived

the Civil Rights Cases's limitations on both Congress's section
five and its commerce clause powers.
69. See Inter-Parliamentary Union, supra note 61.
70. Japan is missing from McDonagh's table on the percentage of women elected
to the national legislature in 2006. I derived this figure from 2011 statistics provided by
the Inter-Parliamentary Union. According to that data, the United States ranked 91st out
of 187 countries and Japan ranked 126th. See id.
71. Frances Rosenbluth et al., Welfare Works: Explaining Female Legislative
Representation,2 POL. & GENDER 165, 165 (2006).
72. "[W]elfare state policies that free women from previously held family duties
provide increased opportunities for women to work outside the home in any field. Such
policies also induce women to involve themselves in politics in order to protect the broad
gender equity gains that welfare state policies achieve. Generous welfare state policies
thus provide the motive and opportunity for women to enter legislative politics." Frances
Rosenbluth, Welfare Works: Explaining Female Legislative Representation, 2 POL. &
GENDER 165, 182 (2006).
73. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
74. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
75. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1966).
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The Equal Protection Clause's "state action" requirement,
however, does not constrain congressional powers provided by
the other Reconstruction amendments. Private people, for
example, can impose "badges and incidents" of slavery on
others.76 The Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship clause could
also be given substantive bite. So interpreted, private persons
could undermine another's citizenship status, just as private acts
create badges and incidents of slavery. Such an interpretation
could give Congress the power to make it illegal for private
individuals to undermine the citizenship status of others. This
part of the Fourteenth Amendment could be interpreted to give
Congress the power to pass legislation like the Violence against
Women Act. Reva Siegel has argued that the 19th Amendment
might also be a basis for Congress to pass this and similar
legislation. A few of the essays in this volume discuss how
actions traditionally deemed "private" undermine women's
equal status as citizens.
For example, Elizabeth Schneider argues, Americans have
not fully appreciated how domestic violence undermines
women's citizenship rights (pp. 378-79, 384-85). Domestic
violence prevents a woman from belonging fully to our society
and polity by imprisoning her in the home-an abuser often
interprets a victim's leaving the house as a threat to his control
over her. "Whether it is being able to get an education, go to
work, participate in civic or self-help activities, exercise the right
to vote, or attend a meeting, the various forms of citizenship and
aspects of broader participation in civil society are important to
women but enormously threatening to the battering relationship" (p. 384).
The United States has made significant progress since the
nineteenth century when violence was accepted as a husband's
prerogative over his wife, Schneider says (pp. 379-80). Now, it
constitutes a crime just the same as other batteries and crimes
against persons. Criminalization should not be a society's only
response to domestic violence, Schneider argues, because

76. Cf Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (holding that refusal
of whites to sell or rent houses to blacks would deny them a civil right in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1982 and thus create a badge or incident of slavery); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 35-36 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. Siegel, She the People, supra note 40, at 1036 ("The Nineteenth Amendment is
thus powerful precedent for federal regulation that enforces equal citizenship norms in
matters concerning family life ... [and it shows] ... that the nation has not always
adhered to a tradition of localism in matters concerning the family.").
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criminalization requires women who want to end the violence in
their relationship to destroy their relationship, too (pp. 382-83).
Children make it practically impossible to end a relationship
completely, as parental visitation rights may require a woman to
continue to engage with an abusive ex (p. 382).
States generally fail to give abused women adequate legal
help to protect themselves from their abusers, Schneider argues
(p. 382). The Constitution does not require them to provide legal
aid to battered women to help them obtain restraining orders or
negotiate family law disputes with abusive spouses, such as
divorce settlements and custody disputes (pp. 387-88).
Immigrants and women of color have particular trouble getting
police to protect them at all, Schneider says (p. 382). Police,
indeed, have no legal duty to protect them, as courts will not
hold state officials liable for failing to protect women from their
abusers, even when a woman has a civil protective order (p. 382).
Demonstrating that domestic violence affects women's equal
citizenship status, Schneider argues, could at least "create
greater pressure for ... state-funded legal representation" (p.
388) for women who need protective orders or help with family
law issues such as divorce or custody. It might also create a
positive right to police protection from abusive spouses.
Mary Anne Case approaches the public/private issue from a
slightly different angle. She rejects the liberal tolerance of
distinctive religious dress for women and supports bans on
Muslim women wearing headscarves and burqas in public (pp.
107-08). Several different European countries have banned veils
and burqas in some public places. France's 2004 ban on girls
wearing headscarves to public school is the most famous. (The
prohibition extends to other religious garb such as yarmulkes,
turbans, or large crosses, as well). In the fall of 2010, France
went even further and banned full-face veils in public. France
has also denied citizenship to a woman because she wore a
burqa-like garment called a niqab. France's justification was that
this woman was insufficiently assimilated into French culture
(pp. 113-14). Accounts differ about the degree to which this
woman was isolated. Case writes that this woman left her
apartment only when her husband or a male relative
accompanied her. In a New York Times interview, however, this
woman, Faiza Silmi, said that she "leave[s] the house when [she]
78. Steven Erlanger, France: Full-Face Veil Ban Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2010, at A8.
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please[s]," has her own car, and shops on her own.79 Germany
prohibits public school teachers from wearing headscarves.
Denmark has recently prohibited Muslim judges from wearing
headscarves when they are on the bench,' and some parts of
Belgium ban girls from wearing headscarves to school."
These public displays of religious belief undermine the
citizenship status of all women, Case contends (pp. 120-21).
State toleration of the public veiling of women implicitly
indicates the acceptability of women's submission and inferiority
to men; that toleration communicates the state's equivocal
commitment to gender equality. Other norms, such as religious
freedom, trump feminism (pp. 118-19). Consequently, Case
argues, countries that are dedicated to women's equality can
justify prohibiting women from wearing distinctive religious
dress in public (pp. 114-15).
The belief that women and men are equal forms a central
part of the identity of some individuals and some societies, much
as religion does in others, Case argues (p. 110). Such persons and
countries are "feminist fundamentalists" (pp. 107, 110). Their
beliefs should carry as much weight as religious beliefs.
Feminism is a fragile, new cultural norm that is not universally
recognized-far from it. The belief that men and women are
equal will survive only if countries actively protect it. Just as
countries with official religions pass laws ensuring proper respect
for the official religion, Case says feminist countries can ensure
that citizens' public actions do not disparage feminism (p. 122) .82
Case may take her argument too far. A nation that tolerates
the covering of women in public might communicate higher
regard for some principles besides feminism, such as official
tolerance of religious diversity or government neutrality with
regard to matters of conscience, but it does not always do so.
79. Katrin Bennhold, A Veil Closes France'sDoor to Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, July
19,2008, at Al.
80. Thomas Buch-Andersen, Row over Denmark Court Veil Ban, BBC NEWS, May
19, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7409072.stm. "[T]he ban will include
crucifixes, Jewish skull caps and turbans as well as headscarves," but "the move is seen as
being largely aimed at Muslim judges." Id.
81. "700 schools in the northern region of Flanders, including some in Brussels"
ban schoolchildren from wearing headscarves to school. Belgian schools ban Muslim
headscarf tribunal, AFP, Sep. 11, 2009, available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/
afp/article/ALeqM5jOauREYO-pnsKGlhSblFys0679A.
82. Case also argues that countries should be permitted to reject citizenship
applications by individuals who plainly disagree with the proposition of sex equality. To
ensure that such policies do not disproportionately screen out women, countries should
probe male applicants' commitment to sex equality.
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Policymakers could believe that bans undermine women's
equality if male family members prohibited uncovered women
from leaving the house or attending school. (Over forty girls
were expelled from school because they refused to remove their
headscarves in school following the 2004 French ban.)" Indeed,
permitting veiling might be the best way to promote feminism. It
permits girls from religiously conservative families to attend
public school with children from many other backgrounds. A
school has the opportunity to teach a girl who wears a headscarf
about principles of sex equality and to practice those principles
as well. Girls lose contact with other children and teachers who
believe girls are equal to boys if they are kept at home to take
correspondence classes or sent to Muslim schools.8 Bans have
caused some girls to end their education prematurely." Some
evidence suggests that French girls who are forced to remove
their headscarves subsequently drop out of school at sixteen
when attendance is no longer required.86 Without a high school
education, such girls are doomed to menial work, depriving them
of the material means to shrug off subordinating cultural beliefs
and don the mantle of equality.
83. See School Ban on Scarves Wins Praise,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, available at
(reporting that Le
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/15/world/europe/15iht-paris.html
Monde had published a report by the "Freedom Committee, a Muslim group supporting
schoolgirls who defied the law," and explaining that that report said that "47 (girls] had
been expelled from school and 533 had agreed under pressure to shed their head
scarves").
84. Similarly, France's denial of citizenship to women who subscribe to traditional
Muslim norms of conduct and dress make these women more vulnerable to exploitation
by their husbands and male relatives, as Kerry Abrams describes in her chapter. Such a
woman cannot leave her husband without losing her right to live in France, which may
mean that not only must she return to her home country but she may also lose her
children, who may have French citizenship.
85. France mandates school attendance until 16, Florence Lefresne, Contribution to
EIRO thematic feature on Youth and work - case of France, EIRONLINE, (May 3, 2007),
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2005/12/tfeature/fr0512101t.htm, so parents cannot
withdraw girls from French public schools without their receiving some alternative form
of education, either in a private school or through correspondence courses.
86. Kimberly Conniff Taber, Isolation Awaits French Girls in Headscarves,
WOMEN'S E-NEWS (Mar. 5, 2004), http://oldsite.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/
1738/context/archive (reporting that an "investigation by Le Monde newspaper in
February [2004] showed that it was rare for the girls who left public school because of the
headscarf to continue any sort of schooling beyond age 16, when it is no longer
required"). It proved frustratingly difficult to determine from English language
newspapers just how many girls have sought alternative education as a consequence of
the ban on headscarves. French schools expelled about 47 girls-hundreds of other
Muslim girls apparently complied with the ban. See School Ban on Scarves Wins Praise,
supra note 83. That figure, however, does not reveal how many girls voluntarily opted for
correspondence courses or private schools. There is some evidence that girls who opted
for correspondence courses quit within 2 years. See Taber, supra.
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In Germany, six states have banned public school teachers
from wearing headscarves, and two other German states have
banned civil servants as well as public school teachers from
doing so." Berlin, for example, "categorically bars all public
school teachers[,] . . . police officers, judges, court officials,
prison guards, prosecutors, and civil servants working in the
justice system, from wearing visible religious or ideological
symbols or garments" except for "small pieces of jewelry."'
These policies have ended many women's careers.89
The European Court of Human Rights has upheld such
bans as applied to students and teachers. One case upheld the
firing of an experienced preschool teacher who had converted to
Islam and started wearing a headscarf to school. "LT]he
ordinance did not target the plaintiff's religious beliefs," the
court held. It was designed, rather, to "protect others' freedom
and security of public order."9' The children in the teacher's
classes-aged 4 to 8-were "easily influenced" by a "powerful
external symbol," the court reasoned. The teacher's headscarf
violated religious freedom of her pupils and their parents and
the government's policy of official religious neutrality.
Interestingly, most of the German states used reasons much
like Case's to justify their bans: wearing headscarves reflects
beliefs that women were subordinate to men, which was
inconsistent with the constitution of these states.93 (The French,
in contrast, cited their religious neutrality principle of Laicite as
the primary motivation for their headscarf ban.)94 Many of the
German women who lost their jobs as a result of the ban
disputed that the headscarf represented their subordination to
men. One teacher implored:
They should ask our colleagues, directors, school inspectors,
the parents, the pupils what kind of persons we are. All of
them ... can attest for sure that I am not oppressed and that I
87. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DISCRIMINATION IN THE NAME OF NEUTRALITY:
HEADSCARF BANS FOR TEACHERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS IN GERMANY 1 (2009),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/germany02O9_webwcover.pdf.
88. Id. at 2.
89. Id. at 41.
90. Id. at 21 (citing Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001 Eur. Ct. H. R. 1 (2001)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 27-30 (explaining why various German states have adopted their
bans).
94. Patrick Weil, Why the French Latcitg Is Liberal, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2699,
2700-01 (2009).
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do not wear the scarf because of oppression.... One cannot
just simply assert this [that the headscarf indicates a woman's
oppression] like this.95
Another protested:
Many women with headscarves are not like this [i.e.,
oppressed or subordinate] and one cannot completely
condemn a religion because of some being like this.... I am
an example for integration ... going out, striving for a job,
finished my studies, did not marry young and only after
completion of my university education.... I chose my
husband freely, not under compulsion, I knew him long
before, like it all should be. I was also not forced to wear the
headscarf-I am practically a model of what they look for.
They have now a promotional program for migrant women to
study to become a teacher. Hello? Here I am, take me!
Many Muslim women complained the ban did not empower
them; it lowered their social status. As one woman put it, "As
long as we were cleaning in schools, nobody had a problem with
the headscarf."' The ban made German citizens (even ones who
were German-born converts) feel like outsiders. "One has the
feeling 'we don't want you'. ... Where should I go? I belong
here. . . . I would never have thought that would be possible." 98
Equality and religious neutrality cannot completely explain
Germany and France's bans. Anxiety about and discomfort with
increasing numbers of Muslim immigrants motivated these bans,
too. That fact is most apparent in Germany-five of the eight
states that ban religious clothing make an exception for
Christian symbols and clothing.' These symbols do not violate
the religious neutrality of the state because they "are in line with
and preserve values expressed in their state constitutions,""
which embody Christian values. Case could respond that
feminist fundamentalism would prescribe a different result. A
nun's habit, for example, embodies the values of the Catholic
Church, which is not an institution committed to the equal status

95. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 87, at 42.
96. Id. at 42-43 (alterations in original).
97. Human Rights Watch, Germany: Headscarf Bans Violate Rights: State
Restrictions on Religious Dress for Teachers Targets Muslim Women (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/02/26/germany-headscarf-bans-violate-rights.
98. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 87, at 41 (alterations in original).
99. Id. at 25-26.
100. Id. at 27.
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of women, as women are ineligible for positions of authority and
leadership within the Church.
Feminist fundamentalism as a principle for action has no
necessary stopping point. Headscarves and burqas may be
particularly visible markers of a world-view in which women are
inferior to men, but they are not the only markers. Indeed, why
single out headscarves? Amish people prescribe modest dress for
women (though men wear distinctively old fashioned clothes, as
well). Mennonites and Orthodox Jews instruct women to dress
modestly and distinctively, while Mennonite and Orthodox men
wear clothes that, if not fashionable, do not call attention to
themselves to the same extent. Indeed, as Beverly Baines points
out in a different chapter, "all major religions" and "not just
Islam .. . proselytize and/or practice sexual hierarchy" (p. 95).
Living in San Diego, I see every day women who have paid
thousands of dollars for painful (and potentially life-threatening)
surgery to enlarge and firm their breasts, smooth their faces, and
slenderize their thighs. They wear skin-tight, low cut shirts and
short skirts and dresses to spotlight the results.'o In Minnesota, I
often saw young women wearing short skirts and high heels as
they bar hopped on nights with temperatures in the 'teens; their
dates wore sensible shoes, slacks, and coats. French women
teeter among uneven cobblestones in high-heeled shoes," which
over time shorten their Achilles tendons, making flat shoes
painful and making sports activities difficult.103
This irony is not lost on French Muslim women and girls.
One French schoolgirl insisted, "People say that it's the women
101. "And what about the 'degrading prison' of plastic surgery?" Martha Nussbaum
demanded in an online column in the New York Times. Martha Nussbaum, Veiled
Threats?, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/
veiled-threats/. "Every time I undress in the locker room of my gym," she writes, "I see
women bearing the scars of liposuction, tummy tucks, breast implants. Isn't much of this
done in order to conform to a male norm of female beauty that casts women as sex
objects?" Id.
102. I exaggerate. French women do not teeter-they expertly and gracefully
negotiate the hazards of uneven cobblestones. Cf Seeking protection in downturn, French
workers strike nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009101/29/worldleurope/29iht-29francestrikeFW.19774970.html (noting that during a
transit strike, "Parisians coped with the temporary adversity in true French style. Women
biked in high heels, and men biked in business suits and ties").
103. January W. Payne, On Your Feet, WASH. POST (May 8, 2007), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/04/AR2007050401940.html (ill-health
effects of high heels include "bunions, stress fractures, joint pain in the ball of the foot,
Morton's neuroma, 'pump bumps' (enlargement of the bony area on the back of heel),
corns and calluses, hammertoe, toenail problems and tight heel cords (shortening or
tightening the Achilles tendon)").
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who wear the veil that are submissive. . . but I think it is those
women [who do not wear headscarves] who are submissive,
because it is what men want, women half naked."'" This girl cut
off her hair when the ban went into force. Some Muslim women
adopt the headscarf in order to avoid the oppressive male gaze.
One French Muslim woman in her twenties said,
I have accepted hijab so that I can be appreciated for my
intellect and personality rather than my figure or fashion
sense. When I face a classmate or colleague I can be confident
that my body is not being scrutinized, [or that] my bra-strap
or pantyline [is] visible. I have repudiated the perverted
values of our society by choosing to assert myself only
through my mind.o"
Another young Muslim woman pointed out how "ironic" it
was "that the French allow people to be topless on the beach but
not covered head to toe in class.""
The principle of feminist fundamentalism is not necessarily
limited to clothing. Women who drop out of the workforce to
care for their young children reinforce the stereotype that this
task is uniquely women's work, making women generally less
desirable to employers.10o Women who choose to work as nurses,
preschool teachers, and elementary school teachers solidify the
stereotype that women, not men, are naturally caring. And why
focus only on women? Certainly men who choose to work in
highly sex-segregated industries such as technology, construction
work, firefighting, mining, or truck and car repair also reinforce
the stereotype that these jobs are men's work.
Furthermore, Case's feminist fundamentalism denies
women respect and agency to determine how highly they rank
equality with men in comparison to other values. Women who
104. Elizabeth C Jones, Muslim Girls Unveil Their Fears, BBC NEWS (Mar. 28,
2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this-world/4352171.stm (alteration in original).
105. Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, CriticalRace Feminism Lifts the
Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 743, 764
(2006) (alteration omitted) (quoting woman featured in Mod. Religion, Women & Islam,
Are You Ready to Meet the Woman Who Can Get by Without Her Looks, http://www.
themodernreligion.com/index2.html (quotation now available at Women in Islam: Are
you ready to meet the woman who can get by without her looks?, ISLAMIC BULLETIN
(Dec. 2001), http://www.islamicbulletin.com/newsletters/issue-22/women.aspx)). Her point
may not be just hyperbole. While of course anecdotal, a visiting colleague of mine who
teaches at the Sorbonne told me that women Ph.D. candidates often dress provocatively
for their oral exams and their dissertation defenses.
106. Id. at 766 (quoting a woman interviewed by the authors).
107. See Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003).
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wear headscarves and burqas cannot be easily dismissed as
having false consciousness. The actual young French women
who refused to shed their headscarves at school make the claim
of false consciousness difficult to defend. The girl who shaved
her head said of the school officials, "They drove me crazy and
tried to brainwash me so much that I got fed up and I did it - I
shaved my hair off," believing that it would free her from the
intrusive male gaze.' This act both isolated her and focused
more attention on her, however. She said that with her head
shaved, "I feel alone now]; I feel like a monster. It's like being
naked on the street."
Beverley Baines also addresses how the public sphere and
the private sphere bleed into one another (p. 83). Many
Muslims, she explains, believe that Sharia (Islamic law) should
govern family law disputes, even in secular societies. Muslims in
Ontario, including some women who identified themselves as
feminists, urged the provincial government to recognize the legal
validity of decisions made by Sharia family law arbitrators.
Baines denies that these feminist Muslim activists suffered from
false consciousness.
In 2006, the Ontario legislature refused to recognize Sharia
arbitration decisions under the Family Statute Law Amendment
Act, which denies legal enforcement for the rulings of religious
arbitrators, but does not outright ban these arbitrations (p. 85).
The debate over Ontario's recognition of these religious family
arbitrations, Baines says, represents on one level the familiar
clash between freedom of religion and women's equality that
Case describes in her chapter (p. 84). Most (non-Muslim)
feminists had fought legal recognition for these religious
arbitrations because "private bargaining in family law tends to
yield inferior results for many women; and women may not be
truly free in their choice to arbitrate" (p. 94). On another level,
however, these values do not inevitably clash-Muslim feminists
argued that "sex equality and religious freedom are equally
compelling values" (p. 84). Their arguments in favor of state
recognition of these arbitration panels, Baines explains,
resemble those of "intersectional feminists, who refuse to choose
between their race and/or sexuality and their feminism" (p. 84).

108. Elaine Sciolino, France Turns to Tough Policy on Students' Religious Garb,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/22/internationalleurope/
22france.html? r=1.
109. Id.
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When religion and women's equality conflict, many
feminists would argue, as Case does, that the state should let
women's equality prevail. It would be discrimination to ratify a
decision premised on the belief that men and women possess
different legal entitlements. Muslim feminists disagree. The
standard feminist position, they argue, infantilizes religious
women and denies them agency to make their own decisions.
Some Muslims honestly believe that people who secure secular
divorces "place their spiritual and social lives in dire peril" (p.
86).no Muslim women are competent enough, they argue, to

choose to be treated unequally in the present life (as measured
by Western norms) to serve God and secure their place in the
afterlife (p. 102). Their argument fell on deaf ears in Ontario, as
the Premier and the legislature believed Canadian law and
Sharia law fundamentally conflicted and could not coexist. The
Muslim feminists' argument simply made no sense in the context
of the Canadian Constitution, which forbids religious
accommodation when religion conflicts with sex equality (p.
104).
Baines argues that Ontario's refusal denies Muslim women
(and, presumably, men) citizenship-they cannot follow their
religion and Canadian law. In her view, this denial is unnecessary
because human dignity, not equality, lies at the heart of the
Canadian Charter (p. 106). Citizens have overlapping
commitments to God and to the state, and recognizing and
adapting law to the "messiness of overlapping commitments" is
"more consistent with protecting human dignity" (p. 106).
Whether or not Baines is right about the essential values of the
Canadian Constitution, Baines is right to point out the irony of
denying women the agency to determine their priorities for
themselves in the name of feminism.
These two chapters by Case and Baines reveal a problem
with using "citizenship" as a new frame to achieve parity for
women: citizenship is too general a concept to resolve specific
controversies."' Case presents a view of citizenship in which the
government is committed to the equal status of men and women
above all other values; it must ensure that the actions of some
individuals do not undermine other individuals' equal status.

110. Quoting Syed Mumtaz Ali & Anab Whitehouse, The Reconstruction of the
Constitution and the Case for Muslim Personal Law in Canada, 13 J. INST. MUSLIM
MINORITY AFF. 156, 170 (1992).
I1.

GEORGE LAKOFF, THE POLITICAL MIND 115 (2008).

174

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 28:139

Baines, in contrast, believes that women's equality is a worthy
goal because it ensures that a state does not arbitrarily deny on
the basis of sex the fundamental liberty of citizens to determine
their own lives. That fundamental liberty of citizens includes the
freedom of an individual to value her religion above the equal
provision of some legal rights. Who is right? "Citizenship"
provides no answer.
This next Section will now to turn to discussing other
problems with using citizenship as a frame to promote women's
substantive equality.
III. EQUAL CITIZENSHIP STATUS IS A WORTHY GOAL
BUT AN UNLIKELY TOOL FOR ACHIEVING
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
The chapters by Case and Baines suggest that citizenship
might be, as Professors McClain and Grossman put it, both too
general a concept and "too contested" to transform the debate
about women's equality. This Section will describe some
additional reasons why equal citizenship status may not be the
best tool for achieving women's substantive equality. First,
gender stereotypes permeate citizenship, so a fight for equal
citizenship status is simply a different battle than that for
women's equality. Unless we wring sex stereotypes out of
citizenship, a quest for equal citizenship status will produce
something different than equality. Given that women and
womanly things historically have suffered from second-class
status, full citizenship status for women may still leave women
stuck in second-class. Neutering the concept of citizenship is no
easy task, either.
Second, citizenship defines a relationship between a person
and a state. Consequently, citizenship rights come with attendant
obligations, a fact that most of the essays of this volume
overlook. Generally put, the more obligations that a citizen
shoulders, the better her claim to demand positive rights from
the state. In a country that obliges a citizen to do relatively little,
shifting from the rhetoric of equality to that of citizenship is
unlikely to change people's attitudes about the positive
entitlements the state should provide to its citizens.
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A. CITIZENSHIP'S MEANING IS CONTESTED AND CONTEXTUAL

1. Citizenship is gendered
Kathryn Abrams's chapter on three modern women's antiwar movements (p. 131) reveals a stumbling block in the way of
the drive for equal status as citizens: gender stereotypes pervade
the concept of citizenship. Her essay cautions that the concept of
citizenship alone cannot do much work for feminism.
Abrams notes that all anti-war protesters face an uphill
battle for credibility. War protesters always risk appearing
cowardly or disloyalll2 because patriotic feelings run at their
highest when war imperils a nation (pp. 132-33). At such a time,
a person's "obligations to the government, rather than ... rights
against it," take center stage (pp. 132-33)."' Anti-war protesters

can establish credibility by claiming that some special
characteristic about their group gives them authority to protest.
One winning strategy is for protesters to assert that they have
made some "individual sacrifice" to support "the war effort" (p.
133). Former soldiers have the greatest credibility as protesters,
as they are turning against the cause that made them heroes (pp.
133-34).
Women anti-war protesters usually cannot assert authority
as former solidiers because American law formally excludes
them from combat (p. 134).'14 Instead, women protesters
traditionally have drawn on their relationships to men who have
been injured or killed during the war. Women who have lost a
son or husband to war, for example, can use their sacrifices as
evidence that they had "resolute[ly] and patriotic[ally]
112. See, e.g., E.J. Montini, What Some Moms Did DuringTheir Summer Vacation, ARIZ.
REPUB., Aug. 16, 2005, at 10B (reporting that "There have been counterprotests [to Cindy
Sheehan's month-long vigil outside of President Bush's Crawford Ranch]. Sheehan has
been accused of being unpatriotic and even treasonous").
113. Emphasis added.
114. Though American law still prohibits women from serving in combat, Lizette
Alvarez, GI. Jane Stealthily Breaks the Combat Barrier, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, at
Al, the United States military has creatively worked around these formal restrictions. Id.
The nonconventional wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, moreover, have blurred the line
between combat and non-combat positions. Id. ("[Tihe Afghanistan and Iraq wars, often
fought in marketplaces and alleyways," have given women the opportunity to "prove[]
their mettle in combat" as the "number of high-ranking women and women who command all-male units has climbed considerably along with their status in the military.").
Women have flown combat aircraft and served on combat ships since the 1990s when
Congress lifted that gender ban. Michele Norris, Roles for Women in U.S. Army Expand,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld
=14869648.
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surrender[ed] ... their family members to military service" (p.

133). Women's protests, in other words, often rely on derivative
authority dependent on the protesters' relationships with men.
The reliance on these roles often calls to mind stereotypes about
wives and mothers, and these stereotypes often color women's
credibility as protesters. Sometimes these stereotypes strengthen
women's protests, and sometimes they weaken them.
Abrams describes three women's antiwar movements that
have played on their womanhood to claim unique authority to
"expose the error of war" (p. 134). Those three are Cindy
Sheehan's month-long vigil outside of George W. Bush's ranch
in Crawford, Texas, in protest of the Iraq war, Code Pink's
protest of both the war in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and the
weekly protests by Israeli Women in Black of the continuing
Palestinian conflict.
Cindy Sheehan's vigil illustrates all of Abrams's main
points. In 2004, Sheehan's son, Casey, was killed in the Iraq war.
President Bush met with her later that year at the White House.
This meeting infuriated her. According to Sheehan, President
Bush "wouldn't look at.. . pictures" of Casey,"' and "[h]e didn't
even know Casey's name."" After her meeting with Bush,
Sheehan felt deeply insulted as a mother and on behalf of her
son. She used President Bush's slights to her and her son to
legitimate her protest later that summer. When President Bush
vacationed at his home in Crawford, Texas, in August of 2004,
Sheehan camped outside its gates. She refused to leave until he
met with her again. She demanded that he explain to her, "Why
did [you] kill my son?"' "[The President] said my son died in a
noble cause, and I want to ask him what that noble cause is."" 8
Was it so noble that "he [had] encouraged his daughters to
enlist" to fight for it?"' She also wanted to "ask[] him to quit
using Casey's sacrifice to justify continued killing" in Iraq. 20 He
should instead "use Casey's sacrifice to promote peace."'12

115. Helen Thomas, Reality of War Spoils Bush's Vacation, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, Aug. 19, 2005, at B6.
116. Interview by Wolf Blitzer with Cindy Sheehan (Aug. 7, 2005), available at
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/07/le.01.html.
117. Editorial, Smearing the Mom of a Soldier: How the Right Attacks Even the
Grieving, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 11, 2005, at 15.
118. Id.
119. Montini, supra note 112, at 10B.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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Sheehan's motherhood gave her real credibility. It gave her
the prerogative to demand President Bush's (and the nation's)
attention: her young son-her flesh and blood-had died in Iraq.
She had "skin in the game," (p. 137) which the President did not.
She had special knowledge about the real costs of the Iraq war
that the President and his advisors lacked because they had not
risked their children's lives.
Sheehan also used her motherhood to establish her
credibility as a protester by camping out in a ditch in the Texas
heat of August. The physical discomfort she endured recalled
other sacrifices of physical comfort and physical appearance that
mothers routinely make (pp. 144-45). (These uncomfortable
conditions also reminded onlookers of the physical discomfort
suffered by soldiers (p. 144).) Finally, her camping outside of
President Bush's ranch effectively staked a claim to that land (p.
144). By refusing to leave, she defended her right to hold it.
Historically women have neither staked nor defended claims to
land. Her "occupation" also symbolized the American troops'
occupation of Iraq. Her occupation of that land grabbed the
media's (and America's) attention (p. 144).
But Ms. Sheehan's motherhood and womanhood planted
some significant landmines in her path, as well (pp. 143-44). Her
plain speaking manner and frequent cursing made her look
coarse, angry, and intimidating (pp. 143-44). Sheehan's husband
filed for divorce during her protest, making her look like a
neglectful wife (p. 147). Worse yet, Sheehan had also left her
other children behind at home, making her look like a bad
mother (p. 147). She was criticized for neglecting these womanly
duties for a political cause (p. 147).
Sheehan's use of her motherhood and the criticisms she
received because of her roles as wife and mother call to mind the
separate spheres ideology of the nineteenth century. That
ideology placed tremendous roadblocks in the way of women's
gaining the right to vote. Women have always been citizens of
the United States, but women could only exercise their
citizenship derivatively as daughters, wives, or mothers for the
first 130 years of America's history. The law forbade them to
vote because their husbands and fathers had the prerogative to
represent their interests. When the Fifteenth Amendment
granted black men the right to vote, Congress relied on this male
prerogative to deny women the vote. Before they could receive
the right to vote, women would have to overthrow "laws and
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customs that restricted women's roles in marriage and the
market," according to Reva Siegel.122
Opponents of women's suffrage feared that giving women
the vote would "attack[] the integrity of the family" as wives
overthrew their husbands' authority to represent them in the
public sphere.123 Women might even oppose their husband's
political views (perish the thought!). Women who asserted a role
in politics, opponents argued, "denie[d] and repudiate[d] the
obligations of motherhood."124 Allowing women to vote
"would .. . utterly destroyfl" "the family" 125
These claims sound comically cataclysmic and far-fetched
today. But the criticisms that Cindy Sheehan received echo this
rhetoric. When her protest conformed to traditional gender roles
these stereotypes helped her cause, as her motherhood gave her
credibility and authority to protest the war. But when her
devotion to her cause led her to neglect her traditional roles as a
woman and mother, she was criticized for her neglect, and her
protest suffered. Sex roles, in short, still affect women's roles as
citizens.
The persistence of these gender stereotypes implies that the
fight for equal citizenship status for women cannot make a
simple end run around the pitfalls of the women's equality
movement. Unless citizenship is neutered, women's "citizenship
status" will reflect stereotypes (or put less negatively,
generalizations) about women. Whether these stereotypes
reduce or increase women's status is hard to say, but that these
stereotypes will affect it is not hard to figure. A fight for equal
citizenship status will therefore produce different results than a
fight for sex equality, which in the United States has focused on
erasing sex stereotyping.
If sex stereotypes are the only barrier to the usefulness of
women's equal citizenship status, then citizenship status is no
worse than equality, which is also dogged by sex stereotypes.
Certainly, sex stereotyping in the United States has lessened
dramatically since the turn of the twentieth century. The arguments against women's right to vote provoke laughter. In thirty
years, our current views of womanhood and motherhood may
seem silly, too.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Siegel, She the People, supra note 40, at 1035.
Id. at 978.
Id.
Id.
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There is, however, an additional problem with the concept
of citizenship that does not affect the concept of equality.
Sheehan's story and the arguments about women's suffrage show
that the concept of citizenship is closely related to the concept of
family. As I will now explain, this close relationship makes
draining gender typing from citizenship difficult. I will argue that
citizenship will continue to reflect sex stereotypes so long as sex
stereotyping still pervades our concept of family. It does not
mean that citizenship can never be sex neutral, but it does
suggest that the rhetoric of citizenship cannot undo mischief
caused by sex stereotyping.
2. Citizens are part of a national family, so as family roles
are gendered citizenship is, too
What does citizenship have to do with families? George
Lakoff, a professor of linguistics at Berkeley, has studied how
our minds process language and understand our experiences and
the world around us. He argues that our early experiences as
children map certain metaphorical frames into our brain
circuitry.126 Those metaphorical frames profoundly influence how

we later perceive and describe people and things around us. Two
of the earliest pleasures we encounter as babies, for example, are
our parents' warm bodies and warm milk. Lakoff says it is no
accident that we later speak of emotional states in terms of
temperature.12 7 "She is a warm person" means "she is affectionate."
"He warmed to her" means "his affection for her grew." 28
The concepts of government and governance grow out of
our family relationships, too, as these relationships are our first
experiences with both. Parents govern their children, telling
them what to do and what is good and bad for them and for the
family. Parents expect things from children-children will speak
to them respectfully, help with chores, eat what's served for
dinner, use decent table manners, do their homework, etcetera.
Parents use carrots and sticks to enforce their expectations and
directives-expressing delight and paying attention to a child's
good behavior, and expressing disapproval, ignoring children,
and withholding rewards and privileges when they do something
parents do not want.
126. LAKOFF, supra note 111, at 83-85.
127. Id. at 84.
128. "Affection is warmth" is not reciprocal. No one says, "The water got more
affectionate," because we encounter temperature in many contexts that have nothing to
do with physical contact. Id.
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According to Lakoff, governments share the elemental
structure of other institutions. Governments are "structured,
publicly recognized social group[s] that persist[] over time.
'Governing' is setting expectations and giving directives, and
making sure that they are carried out by positive or negative

means."1 29

Families are the first institution to which we belong.
Discipline from our parents is our first experience with
governance. As a consequence, our concepts of " overnance and
family life co-occur;" they bleed into each other. o According to
Lakoff, "[t]his co-occurance gives rise to an extremely important
primary metaphor: a Governing Institution is a Family." 3 ' This
metaphor appears whenever we talk of institutions-people, for
example, often speak of companies as families or their coworkers as being just like family.
When this metaphor applies to the government, the
metaphor of family has a few basic variations, Lakoff explains.
Two relate to our discussion of citizenship.
First:
The Institution [the Nation] is the Family
The Governing Individual [the Government] is a Parent
Those Governed [the Citizens] are Family Members 3 2
Second:
The Institution [the Nation] is Family
The Governing Individual [the President] is a Parent
Those Governed [the Citizens] are Family Members'
This metaphor of government as "government as family"
and "citizens as members of a family," are what Lakoff calls
primary metaphors.'3 4 Primary metaphors have "a much stronger
basis in experience than other models," or metaphors, and "our
brains form that mapping more readily and much more

129. Id. at 85.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 86.
133. Id. Lakoff cautions that the fact that, in the metaphor of the government as
family, "citizens are family members" does not mean that "citizens [are] dependent
children." Instead, citizens are just "family members with no further specifications." Id.
at 86, 88.
134. Id.
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strongly.""' This deep mapping means that primary metaphors
cannot be changed readily.
The consequence of these metaphors is that we understand
"citizenship" through the metaphor of family. Families have
gender roles, and, as the previous discussion of Abrams's
chapter and the women's suffrage movement show, the primary
metaphor of "citizens as family" is gendered, too. Our language
and our understanding of history reflect that fact: George
Washington is the father of our country; John Adams, Thomas
Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and Benjamin
Franklin were among our "founding fathers."'36 The Civil War
pitted brother against brother. Platoons of soldiers are "bands of
brothers." The cabinet department in charge of domestic
security (there domestic reflects family) is the "Department of
Homeland Security.""' Thus, someone who thinks the family
model wrongly invokes gender roles cannot just propose a new
metaphor (such as nation as community or nation as team) and
expect that new metaphor to stick."'
The idea that we understand the concept of country and
citizen through our concepts of family and family members helps
to explain why anti-suffragists thought that the vote posed a fatal
threat to the family as an institution. In the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, citizenship, civil rights, and stereotypes
prescribed specific and distinct roles for men and women within
families.'
To the husband, by natural allotment.. ., fall the duties which
protect and provide for the household, and to the wife the
more quiet and secluded but no less exalted duties of mother
to their children and mistress of the domicile. 40
Women were citizens, but in the eyes of the anti-suffragists
women "did not need the vote because they were already
represented in the government by male heads of household."''
Their husbands or fathers had the duty to exercise women's civil

135. Id.
136. Id. at 76, 87.
137. Id. at 76.
138. Id. at 88.
139. Siegel, She the People, supra note 40, at 979 (documenting how gender roles
pervaded these ideas).
140. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting from an 1883 report from the House
Judiciary Committee rejecting a constitutional amendment that would grant women the
right to vote).
141. Id. at 981.
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and political rights for them. The right to vote would "introduce
domestic discord into the marital relation and distract women
from their primary duties as wives and mothers. 142 "American
traditions of individualism, 'self-government,' and 'selfrepresentation' would invade the home and unseat the husband
and father's authority to represent his wife or daughter.143
To refute the argument that the right to vote would destroy
the family, suffragists first had to change law and norms
governing family and marriage. Professor Siegel explains that
the effort to overthrow "the common law of marital status" went
hand in hand with the suffrage fight.144 They "sprang from a
common vision."145 Suffragists' "vision of family life" in which
women were individual legal agents just the same as their
husbands conflicted absolutely with the common law.146 They
labored for decades to change the laws and norms surrounding
families. They attacked marriage and property law, which
deprived women of individual agency. They indicted "male
privilege in the family and elsewhere," denouncing women's
"physical coercion in marriage," such as "domestic violence,
marital rape, and 'forced motherhood."'l 47 Suffragists also
attacked and finally overthrew the legal structures that made
women dependent on their husbands, such as "property rules
that vested in the husband a right to his wife's earnings and to
the value of his wife's household labor."148
Lakoff's notion that "government as family" and "citizens
as family" are primary metaphors explains why suffragists had to
change the laws and norms governing family and marriage
before they gained the right to vote. The argument that women's
equal citizenship status depended on their having the right to
vote made no sense when husbands and fathers were duty bound
to represent their interests. The nineteenth-century concept of
women's citizenship as derivative of their husband's or father's,
indeed, denied women the individual right to vote. Only once
women had independent agency within families-women could
own their own property, make their own money, contract for

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 993.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 992.
Id.
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themselves, and possess their own bodies-did it seem unjust to
deprive women citizens of the right to vote.
The suffrage movement fought for-and created-a new

vision of "family that contemplated a far more prominent role
for women in the nation's economic and political institutions."149
Once suffragists changed the institutions of family and marriage
then, they could argue that giving women the right to vote would
strengthen families. Women citizens could participate in new
forms of "social housekeeping" -helping to make "decisions
about new ways government might provide for the health and
welfare of families living in America's growing cities."',o In short,
suffragists gained the right for women citizens to vote by
changing the role of women citizens to include the individual
right to voting; to do that they had to change gender norms in
families.
The suffragists did not try to erase all gendered ideas about
citizenship or the family; nor is it likely that they could have.
"Our minds already possess frames," Lakoff writes. Successful
policies and political arguments must therefore "fit within
them."' Changes in marriage law and criminal law gave
husbands and wives more equal rights, which changed gender
norms, but did not erase them. As with family, so goes
citizenship. The "social housekeeping" argument, for example,
shows that even after women got the vote, a woman's role as a
citizen was still distinct from a man's. As Professor Abrams'
chapter demonstrated, gender still shapes the concept of
citizenship.
A successful strategy for women's equal status as citizens
cannot simply define citizenship as containing certain attributes
and demonstrate that certain privileges and rights follow from
that definition. If the "frame" of citizenship does not already
contain those attributes, then, as the suffragist movement shows,
the frame or the attributes embedded within it must change first.
The fact that our concept of citizenship remains gendered
reflects the fact that families and familial roles remain gendered
(though certainly gender sha es family and family roles far less
than it did ninety years ago).
149. Id. at 993.
150. Id.
151. LAKOFF, supra note 111, at 68.
152. This concept of frames is a bit circular. The idea that arguments for change
must fit within frames could imply that change is well nigh impossible. For example, the
legal changes to women's rights to own property or to make contracts without their

184

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 28:139

The main argument running through most of this volume's
chapters, thus, relies on a bootstrap. That argument is that "full
citizenship status" requires a change in policies that have
contributed to constructing and support sex inequality (such as
limited and unpaid maternity and paternity leave, and gendered
patterns of childcare). This argument is a bootstrap because
citizenship roles reflect family roles, not the other way around.
These gendered family roles cannot be changed by objecting that
they deny women full status as citizens, because citizenship and
citizenship status are defined in reference to these roles.
Citizenship, in the end, brings us right back to where we
started: to the problem of sex equality. Sex still affects how we
divide work within and outside of the home. Sex stereotypes
drive this division of labor. Martha Fineman's chapter
acknowledges as much. She describes how our American
concept of family undergirds sex inequality. The American
"prelegal notion of the family" inevitably subordinates women
(p. 256). People in the United States, she says, generally believe
that families are independent institutions, wholly distinct and
separate from the state. Women's "unique reproductive roles
and responsibilities ... define them as essentially different and
necessarily subordinate in a world that values economic success
and discounts domestic labor" (p. 256). The idea that family is a
prelegal, private institution is just wrong, Fineman contends. It is
built on an even deeper lie-that individuals are autonomous.
Human life is fragile, she explains. Each of us has been wholly
dependent on others for our survival. Each of us is vulnerable to
becoming so again (pp. 258-59). Recognizing essential human
vulnerability reveals that achieving substantive equality
husbands' consent are inconsistent with the nineteenth century frame of family, in which
the male head of household legally represents and subsumes the legal identities of his
dependents. Change does occur and has occurred, however. Lakoff suggests that change
occurs slowly and incrementally so that we gradually adjust frames rather than
overthrowing them in one fell swoop. So, for example, some husbands abandoned their
families, leaving behind a technically married woman who could not own her own property or make contracts on her own behalf. This practical problem required legal change.
Another explanation may also be possible. Women could invoke other frames with which
their inability to own property and make contracts was inconsistent. When women began
working for wages, for example, their employment was inconsistent with the traditional
role of wife. It may have cued other frames, such as "employee" and "slave." Employees
trade their own individual labor for wages paid to them individually. The nineteenth
century exception to that rule was slavery, in which owners received wages earned by
their slaves' labor, and this frame increased in prominence as the Civil War approached.
Clearly, it would not be acceptable to think of wives as their husband's slaves. If women
were employees, however, then they earned their own wages, and this "counter-frame"
required some adjustment in the frames of wife and family.
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"require[s] state intervention, even .. . reallocation of some
existing benefits and burdens" (p. 259). She is skeptical that we
have wrung all progress from the concept of equality, and
believes that most arguments for changes in family policy will
have to depend on equality.
In sum, stereotyped family roles must change before
stereotypes about citizenship roles will change, given that
citizenship roles reflect family roles, and not the other way
around. Until gender exerts less influence on family roles,
Lakoff's theory predicts that a majority of Americans will not
perceive that women's continued (though significantly lessened)
economic dependence on men brands them as second-class
citizens, or that their disproportionate exclusion from positions
of corporate and political power does either.
As I write this review, however, the gendered concept of
family is undergoing profound changes. Same sex marriage is
one of the forces driving that change.153 New York, one of the
most populous states in the nation, has recently granted same
sex partners the right to marry.'54 Some fear that same sex
marriage threatens the family. They are partly right and
profoundly wrong. They are partly right: as same sex marriage
becomes acceptable, legal families will no longer be constructed
along traditional sex roles. In same sex marriages, women head
families and men care for small children. These changes will
amplify changes that have been occurring for a while. Sex and
gender have shaped the concept of family for a long time (and
vice versa), and gendered families have been one very important
cornerstone of American life.
The idea that same sex marriage threatens the family is
profoundly wrong. Tens of thousands of same sex families show
that individuals do not need to follow traditional gender scripts
to commit to each other for life, and children can successfully be
reared in families without these scripts, too."' A belief in the
153. Of course, gender roles within marriage have been eroding for decades. See
generally Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Is Anyone Doing the Housework?: Trends in the
Gender Division of Household Labor, 79 Soc. FORCES 191, 191 (2000) (documenting
how women did half as many hours of housework in the 1990s than they did in the 1960s
while men's hours doubled over the same period).
154. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (1) (McKinney 2011) ("A marriage that is otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same
or different sex.").
155. Rachel H. Farr et al., Parenting and Child Development in Adoptive Families:
Does Parental Sexual Orientation Matter?, 14(3) APPLIED DEV'L. SCI. 164, 166 (2010)
(summarizing research that has shown that the sexual orientation of parents is not linked
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equality of committed same-sex couples and different-sex
couples simply belies the belief that sex roles are essential to
family. The institution of family will persist after same sex
marriage becomes routine, just as it did after women started
voting.
That gender roles in marriage and family are eroding does
not necessarily mean, however, that in two decades Americans
will have paid parental leave, sex quotas in national office, or
federal laws that criminalize domestic abuse or date rape. A
further problem lurks about the use of citizenship to insist on
policies and programs to improve the substantive equality of
women. The concept of "full citizenship status" does not itself
specify the rights required to have full citizenship status. Instead,
as this next section will explain, the rights required for a person
to have "full citizenship status" vary from country to country.
3. Citizenship rights depend on citizens' obligations, and
different nations hold their citizens to different
obligations
As this review described earlier, T.H. Marshall, and other
citizenship theorists who followed him, have divided citizenship
rights into three classifications: civil rights (e.g., to sue, contract,
and own property), political rights (e.g., to vote and hold office),
and social or economic rights (e.g., sufficient economic security
to exercise civil and political rights). Marshall theorized that
citizenship required rights from each.
The introduction to Gender Equality leans heavily on
Marshall in describing how citizenship might provide a means
for achieving greater substantive equality for women.
(Marshall's theory of citizenship does continue to be the most
influential.)"' It argues that women's full citizenship status
requires countries to ensure women's social rights, which means
that states must grant its people certain positive rights. These
rights may include long, paid parental leaves, quotas to ensure a
proportionate number of women hold national political office,
enhanced state protection for women from private violence, and
the right to abortion. Without such rights, women will, for
example, shoulder more housework and childcare, which will
with "child ... outcomes," but rather that "family processes, such as parenting quality
and attachment" better predict "child outcomes").
156. See THOMAS JANOSKI, CITIZENSHIP & CIVIL SOCIETY 6-7 (1998) (describing
Marshall's influence on political theory).
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prevent a disproportionate number of women from climbing the
corporate ladder or serving in important positions of political
power. Women will be rendered second-class citizens if a
disproportionate number of women are housekeepers and men
are national political and corporate leaders.
The introduction appears to portray Marshall as positing
that countries necessarily have a duty to provide citizens with
specific social rights. If that portrayal is right, then states must
ensure certain positive rights to prevent women from being
second-class citizens. A very good argument can be indeed made
that robust social rights are necessary to guarantee women's full
status as citizens.
Gender-neutral, unpaid leave simply has not equalized
women's economic or social status in the United States because
it has not equalized parenting responsibilities for infants and
young children. More women than men take parental leave, and
they take more of it, too.' 7 This fact creates a feedback loop of
gendered patterns of work inside and outside the home.
Women's leaves permanently reduce their wages;"' lower wages
mean woman take on far more than half of the work at home;
these burdens on time and energy reduce women's interest in
full time work, which further reduces their wages; and so on. As
American society values paid work more than unpaid work in
the home, women who stay home with children do not have the
social status of men and women who work. It hardly bears
mentioning that the United States' current scheme of unpaid
leave hampers women from burnishing their resumes and
making the connections a person needs to run for (much less
win) political office. So stereotypes persist that men make more
effective leaders.
The right for parents to take significant paid leave from
work would disrupt the feedback loop of gendered decisions that
tend to push women out of the workforce or into part time work
157. McGowan, supra note 21, at 27. Many different reasons contribute to this
tendency. Men who shoulder an equal or more than equal share of housework and
childcare suffer from stereotype backlash from their coworkers, friends, and
acquaintances. Id. at 39. Rarely do people ask expectant fathers whether they plan to
return to work after their new child is born. Women routinely entertain this question. Id.
at 25. Wives often make less money than their husbands, making their salary easier to
forgo. Id. at 26-27. Women also tend to assess their salaries in light of how much they are
paying in childcare, while men don't.
158. Even a year off from work hurts a woman's career; she will lose on average 11%
of her previous wages. Three years' leave to care for children reduces a woman's wages
by nearly 40%. Id. at 28 (citing Hewlett & Luce, supra note 21, at 46).
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when they have children. Paid parental leave encourages more
men to take more and longer leaves."9 The most successful of
these policies require men to take some significant part of the
leave or the family loses that leave time entirely." In general,
"Countries that offer leave benefits for fathers for long enough
and with high enough wage replacement have quickly seen" the
rate of men taking parental leave increase. "[C]lose to 90
percent of fathers are reported to take paid paternity leave in
Denmark,
Iceland,
Sweden,
The
Netherlands,
and
Norway... ."161 Providing men and women with paid parental
leaves of about nine months to a year also appears to reduce the
"mommy penalty"-the reduction of women's wages that often
accompanies motherhood, especially when women take long
breaks from work.'62 Recall, too, that McDonagh found that

159. EILEEN APPELBAUM & RUTH MILKMAN, LEAVES THAT PAY: EMPLOYER AND
WORKER EXPERIENCES WITH PAID FAMILY LEAVE IN CALIFORNIA 17 (2011)

(California's provision of "wage replacement during family leaves[] seems to be an
effective incentive for men's increased participation in caregiving, both for fathers who
are bonding with new or newly adopted children and for those caring for seriously ill
family members."). With regard to paid leave for pregnancy or parenthood, only a few
states-most notably California-require employers to reasonably accommodate the
actual physical limits an individual woman's pregnancy imposes on her. CAL. Gov. CODE
§ 12945(b)(1) (West 2005). Two states, California and New Jersey, also provide some
paid parental leave to new parents funded by the state unemployment insurance system.
The state of Washington has passed a similar insurance program for parental leave, but
budget cuts have delayed its implementation until 2012. Sylvia Hsieh, Delay in Paid
Family Leave Act, LAW. WKLY. USA (May 21, 2009); Rachel La Corte, Some WA
Programs Laws in Name Only, SEATTLE TIMES (May 30, 2010). California and New
Jersey pay out fairly low benefits, however, and for a total of 6 weeks (though two
parents who do not work for the same employer can each take leave, for a total of 12
weeks of benefits). California's scheme pays out 55% of a person's weekly wages, up to a
maximum benefit of $987 in 2011. APPELBAUM & MILKMAN, supra, at 1. New Jersey
provides two-thirds of a person's average weekly wage for six weeks, up to a maximum of
$559 per week. State of N. J. Dep't of Labor and Workforce Dev., Wage RequirementsState Plan, http://lwd.state.nj.us/labor/fli/worker/state/FLSP-wage-requirements.html
(last visited Sep. 30, 2011).
160. APPELBAUM & MILKMAN, supra note 160, at 17 (discussing how Sweden's
introduction of "'lose it or use it' days, which are additional days of [paid] leave that are
granted to the family if and only if they are taken by the father" dramatically increased
the number of men taking parental leave and the amount of leave they took).
Appelbaum and Milkman also report that men in California are taking longer leaves now
that that state provides some wage replacement. Id. at 18-19. Since California began
offering wage replacement, the proportion of bonding leave claims filed by men has
increased steadily over the life of the program, from 17% of bonding claims in 2004-05 to
26% of claims in 2009-10. Id. at 18 fig.3.
161. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAILING ITS FAMILIES: LACK OF PAID LEAVE AND
WORK-FAMILY SUPPORTS INTHE US 34-35 (2011).
162. Id. at 35 (citing studies showing that countries with no paid leaves have the
highest wage penalty for motherhood but that countries with paid leaves under a year
have lower motherhood wage penalties).
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countries with robust social rights also elected more women to
national political office.
The introduction and this volume of essays emphasize
Marshall's discussion of citizenship rights to the near exclusion
of his discussion of citizenship obligations. Rights and
obligations cannot be separated, however. Marshall himself said,
"If citizenship is invoked in defense of rights, the corresponding
duties of citizenship cannot be ignored."' For Marshall,
citizenship rights and citizenship obligations are a two-way
street. The more obligations citizens shoulder, the greater the
state's obligation to provide rights to its citizen, and vice versa.
States strike different balances between rights and obligations,
and the balance a country strikes depend on its history and
culture. A country's failure to provide citizens with generous
social rights does not necessarily mean that it denies its people
full citizenship rights. Some states that oblige their citizens to do
relatively little may define citizenship rights to include mostly
negative rights rather than positive rights.
Thomas Janoski, a political scientist, has studied different
countries to find out how well actual governments fit with
Marshall's framework. After studying over a dozen different
democracies, Janoski found a great deal of variance in social
rights among democracies. Some provided robust social rights
(such as paid parental leave, a minimum guaranteed income,
free healthcare) and others did not. Social rights correlated
positively with citizen obligations. The more citizens were
obliged to do (such as high taxes and compulsory militar
service)'" the more robust their social citizenship rights.1
Countries that imposed relatively heavy obligations on its
citizens and provided them with lots of social rights, Janoski
found, tended to have fairly equal wealth distribution as well.
The United States imposes relatively few obligations on
citizens compared with other countries that provide lots of social
rights. Scandinavian countries, for example, require young men
to serve for 8 to 15 months in the military.' Individuals and
couples in these countries pay much higher taxes, too. In 2010,
the average tax wedge for a two-earner couple with two children

163.
164.
165.
166.

JANOSKI, supra note 156, at 53 (quoting T.H. Marshall).
Id. at 125.
Id. at 125-33.
Id. at 58 tbl.3.3.
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was 34% in Denmark, 33% in Norway, and 38.5% in Sweden.'
A comparable American family pays about 25% of its income in
taxes.' The average tax wedge for individuals was 38% in
Denmark, 37% in Norway, 43% in Sweden, and 30% in the
United States.169 As might be predicted from these tax rates,
wealth is fairly equally distributed in Scandinavian countries.o
It is not in the United States.
Marshall's theory would imply (and Janowski confirms) that
United States citizens have mostly negative social rights and few
positive social rights.172 American citizens have no obligation to
vote, and most do not. The military has drafted no one into
service for almost 40 years. The military instead has entirely
relied on a volunteer military, even though two long wars in the
last 10 years have deployed well over a hundred thousand
soldiers at a time. Unless a family member or friend has been
deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan, the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq have barely touched daily civilian experience. Though we
have spent trillions of dollars on these wars and amassed record
budget deficits, President Bush left his 2001 tax cuts in place and
7
tried to make them permanent."'
Democrats and Republicans
continue to battle whether they will expire or be extended. 174

167. The 2010 rates in Denmark and Sweden are much lower than they were in 2000.
In 2000, a Danish two-earner couple with two children paid 39% of its income in taxes,
while such a Swedish couple paid 46% of its income in taxes. OECD Statistical Extracts,
Comparativetables, Two-earner married couple, one at 100% of average wages and the other at
67%, 2 children, average tax wedge, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=
AWCOMP (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).

168. Id.
169. OECD Statistical Extracts, Comparative tables, Single person at 100% of
average earnings, no child, average tax wedge, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?
DataSetCode=AWCOMP (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). As was true for married couples,
the 2010 tax wedge for individuals in Sweden and Denmark is much lower than it was in
2000. In 2000, an individual in Denmark paid 44% of her income in taxes and 50% in
Sweden. Id.
170. JANOSKI, supra note 156, at 136.
171. There are other important differences. Scandinavian countries tend to have a
corporatist structure to their governments; that is, they formally include important social
groups in governing. The United States, in contrast, is pluralistic: interest groups vie for
political power, and no interest group is guaranteed a seat at the table. Id. at 109.
172. Id. at 106.
173. Bush Wants Tax Cuts Made Permanent,USA TODAY (Jun. 2, 2008), http://www.
usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-06-02-bush-taxN.htm (explaining that President
Bush campaigned to make his tax cuts permanent, saying that allowing them to expire
would be harmful to an already limp economy).
174. Jim Kuhnhenn, Obama Unveils Deficit Reduction Plan, 'Buffett Rule' Tax on
Millionaires, HUFF. POST POL. (Sep. 19, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
09/19/obama-deficit-plan-buffet-rule-taxes-medicare n_969403.html.
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The United States' refusal to adopt robust social policies
like generous paid parental leaves does not necessarily represent
hostility in the United States to women's full citizenship. The
United States does not, for example, provide generous genderneutral social rights, like a guaranteed minimum income or
universal health care while withholding programs and benefits to
help women balance home and work responsibilities."' The
United States' failure to provide generous, paid parental leave
likely reflects America's general pattern of providing thin social
rights. This review essay cannot definitively answer why the
United States provides its citizens with few positive rights
compared with other countries.' 6

175. The United States' treatment of injured war veterans provides a vivid example
of its general ambivalence toward guaranteeing robust social rights. Injured veterans, as
might be predicted, have many "social rights" when compared with the civilian
population-paid health care and rehabilitation, generous payments for work disability,
and educational benefits. Few are more venerated as citizens than those who have
sacrificed their health on the battlefield. Year after year, however, Congress underfunds
these programs and benefits. Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability
Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1084 (2010) ("Veterans programs and
commitments are chronically underfunded, administration is poor, and bureaucracies are
inefficient."); id. at 1125 (explaining that problems of chronic underfunding, poor
administration, and poor integration of services "have been exacerbated by the current
conflicts [in Afghanistan and Iraq], which were not adequately planned and budgeted for
by the federal government"). At the height of the Iraq war, for example, wounded
soldiers languished in Walter Reed Hospital. The hospital lacked adequate staff,
supplies, and services. Id. at 1099 n.88. Wounded war veterans have sacrificed their
health and bodily integrity for this country, and yet Congress does not feel obliged to
fund these services fully. When the federal government's failure to create a system for
paid parental leave is considered along with the federal government's treatment of war
veterans, the United States looks more hostile toward guaranteeing positive social rights
than hostile to women's full status as citizens.
176. Janoski argues that a country's balance between rights and obligations reflects
the country's origin and history. See JANOSKI, supra note 156, at 142-72. Scandinavian
countries, for example, have been homogeneous societies for most of their histories.
They may welcome immigrants, but the United States is a nation of immigrants. Norway
and Denmark both were occupied during World War II, which solidified their
populations against their occupiers. The United States prevailed in WWII, which
strengthened our country's might and economy and made the United States a very
prosperous country in the 1950s. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark also have parliaments
with proportional representation; we have a two-party, first past the post system.
Working class parties have also formed political coalitions with either agrarian or liberal
parties in Scandinavian countries, increasing the political power of tower income people;
the working class, agrarians, and liberals often oppose each other in the United States.
Compared to the United States, a much larger large proportion of Scandinavian
countries' population is over 65 and was throughout the twentieth century. Their
embrace of robust social policies may reflect the fact that they have come to grips with
humanity's vulnerability and interdependence-something that Martha Fineman
contends the United States tends to deny. Each of these factors, Janoski argues,
contributes to the Scandinavian countries' higher tolerance for taxation and compulsory
military service and their preference for wealth equality and social services.
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Given the United States' longstanding ambivalence to
positive rights, framing policies as necessary to ensure women's
full status as citizens probably will not help get these policies
enacted. Americans seem not to understand positive rights as
essential to individual citizenship. "Citizenship," thus, cannot be
expected to deliver more positive rights than "equality" has.
In short, it is unrealistic to hope that much progress can be
made on women's rights by reframing the fight from a battle for
equal protection of the laws to one for women's equal status as
citizens. Those who want greater substantive gender equality
must persuade our fellow citizens to adopt policy changes that
will change family and gender roles.
IV. CONCLUSION
Occam's razor suggests that if we want women and men to
have equal social and economic status then we should argue that
equality demands it. Equality has achieved enormous victories
quickly. Forty years is an instant in the course of the history of
human civilization, which has often relegated women into
subservient roles.
Lakoff's theory about the relationship between our primary
frames of family and our concept of citizenship fits with what we
know about the barriers to women's equal pay and equal status
in the United States. As I have discussed in detail elsewhere,'
two main phenomena account for most of the wage gap between
women and men in America: occupational segregation ' and the
unequal division of household labor and childcare. 7 '
177. These two paragraphs draw heavily upon McGowan, supra note 21, at 42-43.
178. The proportion of women in an occupation explains between approximately 20
to 30 percent of that wage gap. Stephanie Boraas & William M. Rodgers III, How Does
Gender Play a Role in the Earnings Gap?: An Update, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 2003,
at 9, 11. It is a linear relationship-the greater the proportion of women in an industry,
the less they make. Id. at 13. Women working in predominately female occupations earn
25.9% less than those in predominately male occupations. Id. at 14. Men working in
predominately female occupations earn 12.5% less than those in predominately male
occupations. Id.
179. American women with children take significantly more leave from work (for
parenting and other reasons) than women without children and men with or without
children. Women take leaves that average a little over two years, while men take about
three months. Hewlett & Luce, supra note 21, at 46 (finding that women in their study
took leaves averaging 2.2 years); see also Claudia Goldin, The Quiet Revolution That
Transformed Women's Employment, Education, and Family, AM. ECON. REV., May 2006,
at 1, 16 (finding that among 1976 women college graduates, leaves averaged 2.08 years).
The more children a woman has, the longer she remains out of the workforce. Id. at 17
(findings based on College and Beyond data that one child increased a woman's time off
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Norms that relate to men and women's gender roles in the
family contribute to both to the division of housework and
childcare and to occupational segregation. First childcare:
stereotypes that "children naturally have a special bond with
[their] mothers ... [and] men cannot nurture infants the way
mothers can" strongly influence parents to divide paid work,
housework, and childcare according to sex stereotypes-'so
Housework and childcare skew women's job preferences before
they ever become pregnant. Women anticipate their future work
as mothers, and when considering what careers to pursue,
women, not men, "routinely think about how motherhood can
be combined with a particular career.""' When men and women
are later faced with the struggle to balance home and work life,
women thus have fewer obstacles-both mental and actual-to

cut back or adjust their work schedules.' No surprise then that
when men have children, their earnings increase, 83 while
women's decrease.
Stereotypes about familial roles are so strong that women
working outside the home pay for the perception that they are
primarily responsible for the care of children, whether they are
or not. A recent study found that "employed mothers in the
United States suffer, on average, a 5 percent wage penalty per
child even after controlling for other factors that affect wages."18 '
by about 4 months (.36 years), two by 17 months (1.41 years), and three by 34 months
(2.84 years)). Forty-three percent of highly qualified women with children (defined as
those who had a graduate, a professional, or a high-honors undergraduate degree) have
voluntarily left work for six months or more. Hewlett & Luce, supra note 21, at 44. Only
24% of highly qualified men have. Less than a sixth of those men who took time off did
so to stay home with a child. Id. at 45.
180. Francine M. Deutsch, Equally Shared Parenting, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHOL. Sci. 25, 26 (2001).
181. FRANCINE M. DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL: How EQUALLY SHARED
PARENTING WORKS 149 (1999).
182. Id.
183. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Transitions:Careerand Family Life Cycles
of the EducationalElite, AM. ECON. REV., May 2008, at 363, 367.
184. Two years leave, the average for women, decreases a woman's salary by 18%
when she returns to work. Even a year's leave hurts-returning salaries are 11% lower.
Longer leaves hurt more: leaves of 3 years or longer reduce a woman's wages by almost
40%. Hewlett & Luce, supra note 21, at 46. Women who leave the job market during
those years may find that their earnings never "catch up" to men's. Id. at 46 (quoting
Lester Thurow). Leaving work for over six months also makes it harder for women to
return to full-time work. Only 74% of women who wanted to return to work could do so,
and only 40% actually returned to full-time professional work. Id. Others took part-time
jobs or became self-employed. Id.
185. Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Shelley J. Correll, Motherhood as a Status Characteristic,
60 J. Soc. ISSUES 683, 683 (2004) (citing Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage
Penalty for Motherhood,66 AM. SOC. REV. 204 (2004)).
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Women labor "under pressure from ambient stereotypes saying
that mothers can't be serious professionals."1 6 When professsional women become mothers they trade the stereotype that
they are competent but unlikable for the stereotype that they are
warm but incompetent."" (Proof that you can't have everything.)
People commonly believe that working mothers are less competent than working fathers or childless women, but they
perceive fathers as more competent than childless men."' This
perception of working fathers and mothers is predictable given
our cultural belief that women should be the primary caregivers
and men should be the breadwinners. 89
Occupational segregation and a gendered division of
childcare and housework have persisted' despite women's
significant gains in educational attainment, which now equals or
exceeds men's.191 They have also persisted despite women's
significant enga ement in paid work and the prevalence of twoearner families. 2
This gloomy state of affairs does not have to persist, and I
predict it will not. In the last 40 years, the fight for women's
equality has changed gender roles and family roles
tremendously. Pinching, patting, ogling and wolf whistling at
women workers was just good fun in the 1970s, while today
enough of it will violate federal law. Women now hold jobs in
many occupations that men dominated in the 1960s and the
1970s.'93 Both men and women workers have the federal right to
take equal amounts of parental leave. In the 1970s, women alone
fought for voluntary maternity leave with a right to
reinstatement and against mandatory maternity leaves that
186. Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn't
Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701, 701 (2004).
187. Id. at 703-04.
188. Id. at 709 tbl. 1.
189. Id. at 706.
190. See supra Parts II.A & II.B.
191. In 2000, 30% of young women (25 to 29) had a college degree or more, while
28% of young men did. The Graduates: Educational Attainment, 2000, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, 9-2, http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop-profile/files/2000/chap09.pdf.
192. Seventy-eight percent of mothers were employed in 2000. SUZANNE BIANCHI
ET AL., CHANGING RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 45 (2006). Among people
who worked, 78% were part of a dual-earner family. Rosalind Chait Barrett, On Multiple
Roles: Past, Present, and Future, in HANDBOOK OF WORK-FAMILY INTEGRATION 76
(KAREN KORABIK ET AL., EDS. 2008). Looking at the data from a slightly different angle,
in 2000, both spouses worked in about 54% of American marriages; among families with
children under age 6, that figure increases slightly to about 58%. HARRIET B. PRESSER,
WORKING INA 24/7 ECONOMY 61 (2003) (citing 2000 Census data).
193. Occupational desegregation has stalled in the last 10 to 15 years.
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forced them out of work during their pregnancies. All-male
colleges and universities do not exist anymore; several Ivy
League colleges, a few elite state universities, and military
academies excluded women as recently as the mid 1970s. 94
Rogers Smith mused that men will have to be persuaded
that women's equality works for them (p. 33). As the arguments
generally stand, achieving equality for women has generally
meant extinguishing many of the privileges of manhood (p. 33).
For some men, these privileges are part of the natural order of
the world. For others, they are merely privileges, but privileges
that they greatly enjoy and may be loathe to relinquish. Men
have to be persuaded that they have something to gain from sex
equality, too. Thus, I have titled this review "Stop Fighting for
Women's Equality." A battle for sex and gender equality must
be waged instead, and men may indeed have something to gain
from this battle. But citizenship is not going to win it.

194. The military academies began admitting women in 1976 after Congress
authorized women's admission in 1975; Columbia College first admitted women in 1983,
Dartmouth in 1972, Brown in 1971, Princeton and Yale in 1969. Harvard merged
admissions with Radcliffe in 1977 and the two institutions formally merged in 1999.

